China Demands Removal of Philippine Warship from Ayungin Shoal

The shoal has been a persistent flashpoint due to the BRP Sierra Madre, an aging Philippine Navy landing ship deliberately grounded there in 1999. More than two decades later, the vessel remains an active Philippine military outpost with personnel stationed aboard.

The BRP Sierra Madre's personnel are dependent on regular rotation and resupply missions for food, water, and other essentials. Pressure intensified on August 27, 2026, when Senior Colonel Jang Shaolong, spokesperson for China's Ministry of National Defense, renewed Beijing's demand for the Philippines to remove the ship. China argues that the shoal is part of its Nansha Qundao (Spratly Islands) and maintains that its provisional understanding with Manila is limited to humanitarian resupply.

Chinese officials explicitly state they will not accept attempts to use resupply missions to build fixed facilities or turn the Sierra Madre into a permanent outpost. Conversely, the Philippine position fundamentally differs, asserting that Ayungin Shoal lies within the Philippines' exclusive economic zone and continental shelf under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Award further supports Manila's claim.

The Philippines asserts that Ayungin Shoal lies within an area where it holds relevant maritime entitlements, a position China rejects and refuses to recognize. Manila does not argue that Ayungin is an ordinary island capable of generating its own territorial sea; instead, it contends that the shoal falls within maritime zones where the Philippines possesses sovereign rights and jurisdiction. On September 1st, the Philippine National Maritime Council publicly rejected China's latest position, stressing that Manila's policy remains unchanged and its actions in the West Philippine Sea are guided by UNCLOS and the 2016 arbitral award.

The Philippines' position is that Ayungin, as a low-tide elevation inside its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf, cannot itself generate separate maritime zones. Consequently, Manila maintains that its activities around the Sierra Madre are exercises of Philippine rights and jurisdiction, not operations requiring Beijing's approval. Two days later, an exchange of information process began.

The information exchange process is intended to reduce the risk of misunderstanding during rotation and resupply missions, not to create a system where the Philippines must ask China for approval before acting. Ma. Teresa Lazaro stated, "This is just an information exchange. There is no permission that is being asked under the arrangement." Philippine military authorities determine when a mission will take place, and the Department of Foreign Affairs then exchanges information with the Chinese side about the operation and expected vessels. Lazaro noted that 16 rotation and resupply missions have taken place in roughly the previous two years under this framework.

While the record shows that practical coordination can reduce immediate danger, it has not resolved the larger disagreement. China continues to describe the mechanism as a "humanitarian arrangement" and insists it cannot be used to reinforce the Sierra Madre or establish a permanent Philippine facility. Manila, by contrast, states the understanding does not weaken its legal position and does not diminish its maritime rights. This fundamental difference explains why the Sierra Madre carries political weight far beyond the ship's physical condition.

It could be viewed domestically as accepting Beijing's authority over an area where international law recognizes Philippine maritime rights and jurisdiction. For China, continued Philippine efforts to maintain the ship raise concerns that an aging, grounded vessel could evolve into a more durable outpost. Beijing repeatedly focuses on elements that could make the Philippine presence permanent, seeing any reinforcement as a violation of their agreement.

President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. has consistently combined two messages: Manila will defend its rights while keeping diplomatic channels with Beijing open. Marcos Jr. declared, "I will not preside over any process that will abandon even one square inch of territory of the Republic of the Philippines to any foreign power." This statement, first delivered during his State of the Nation Address in July 2022, remains politically relevant as maritime tensions persist throughout his presidency. The risks around Ayungin were underscored again on July 20, 2026, when according to Philippine authorities, China Coast Guard personnel approached the area near the Sierra Madre.

The Philippine military reported that a Chinese crew member struck a Philippine Navy sailor on the head with a wooden baton, injuring him and damaging a Philippine rubber boat. China disputed Manila's account, accusing Philippine personnel of dangerous actions against a Chinese patrol boat and claiming Filipino personnel used oars or long sticks during the confrontation. These competing versions illustrate a recurring problem in the South China Sea, where small boats, coast guard craft, and military personnel often come within meters of each other, leaving little room for error if an encounter turns physical.

A prior confrontation on June 17, 2024, resulted in eight Philippine Navy personnel injured, with Seaman First Class Jeffrey Picundo losing his right thumb, which was later surgically restored and regained normal function. The Armed Forces of the Philippines also accused China Coast Guard personnel of taking seven rifles, damaging two rigid-hull inflatable boats, and destroying or disabling equipment being transported. This incident became a primary reason for the two governments to move toward a provisional understanding on resupply operations the following month.

For a period, the provisional understanding mechanism helped lower the temperature, with Philippine officials reporting a series of incident-free missions. This demonstrated that even governments with sharply opposing legal and strategic positions can sometimes establish procedures to reduce immediate operational risk. However, on August 23rd, the Armed Forces of the Philippines rejected Chinese claims that Manila had made a binding commitment to remove the Sierra Madre. Retired Rear Admiral Roy Vincent Trinidad, AFP spokesperson for West Philippine Sea concerns, accused Beijing of attempting to rewrite the history surrounding the vessel.

The disagreement is not solely about the cargo aboard a Philippine resupply boat, but also about the Sierra Madre's physical usability. Decades of exposure to saltwater, storms, and tropical conditions have caused structural deterioration. While food, water, and personnel rotations keep the garrison functioning, they do not address the long-term structural issues. Consequently, almost every mission to the ship becomes politically sensitive, particularly when either side suspects the cargo could alter the outpost's condition or status.

Another significant layer of risk surrounds Ayungin Shoal because the Philippines is a treaty ally of the United States. Washington has repeatedly affirmed that the 1951 U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty extends to armed attacks on Philippine armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft, including those of its Coast Guard, anywhere in the South China Sea. While not every collision or confrontation would automatically trigger an American military response, the alliance means a serious armed attack involving Philippine forces could rapidly escalate into a crisis extending beyond Manila and Beijing.

The facts, severity, and circumstances of any incident would be critical in determining a U.S. military response. The Philippines has also expanded maritime and defense cooperation with other partners, including Japan and Australia. China, meanwhile, has repeatedly criticized the growing involvement of outside powers in South China Sea disputes. These overlapping security relationships make an already complicated maritime confrontation even more intricate. The political importance of the West Philippine Sea remains visible at the highest level of the Philippine government.

On September 1st, President Marcos Jr. instructed newly promoted Philippine Coast Guard flag officers to continue patrolling the West Philippine Sea, supporting resupply missions, and standing by Filipino fishermen in contested waters. Across the dispute, President Xi Jinping's government continues to assert China's position in the South China Sea and rejects the 2016 arbitral ruling. The Marcos administration, conversely, relies on UNCLOS and the arbitral award as the legal foundation of its position. For now, neither government appears prepared to concede the central issue.

China continues to call for the removal of the BRP Sierra Madre and warns it will oppose attempts to establish permanent facilities at the shoal. The Philippines, however, states it made no binding commitment to remove the vessel, does not require Chinese permission for lawful activities at Ayungin, and will continue supporting its personnel stationed aboard. At the same time, both governments have strong reasons to prevent another confrontation from becoming uncontrollable, which makes Ayungin Shoal so dangerous.

The next major crisis does not have to begin with naval gunfire or a large warship; it could start with another rubber boat, a disputed resupply mission, another collision, an attempt to block Philippine personnel, or a disagreement over whether a shipment contains basic necessities or materials intended to keep the Sierra Madre standing. An aging military ship grounded on a remote reef has become deeply connected to international law, national credibility, military alliances, and the wider strategic balance across the Indo-Pacific. Neither Manila nor Beijing needs to fire a shot for the confrontation to become much more serious, as even an ordinary supply mission at Ayungin Shoal can carry far-reaching consequences.