Trump Halts US-ROK Drills for US-DPRK Dialogue

President Trump made the decision to suspend the UFS US-ROK combined exercise as a political judgment. While it was a decision that defied military common sense, it was a measure that transcended military considerations for political purposes. The suspension of the exercise was closely linked to major security agendas, such as the transfer of wartime operational control, and was intended to send a clear message to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.

US-ROK joint exercises are divided into the Freedom Shield exercise in the first half of the year and the Ulchi UFS exercise in the second half. While the Freedom Shield exercise in the first half is a purely military exercise, the Ulchi UFS in the second half includes government-level emergency preparedness training. The Ulchi exercise is an important drill for practicing government-level responses in preparation for war.

Large-scale combined exercises such as Freedom Shield are planned at least a year in advance, and troops and supplies are mobilized months before the exercise. Dr. Cho Han-beom pointed out that with all preparations complete, the suspension of the exercise resulted in the waste of vast sums of money already spent and mobilized troops. This demonstrates how political decisions can severely undermine military efficiency.

Dr. Cho Han-beom explained that war is one of the important tools of national governance, and the ultimate responsibility for its operation lies with the supreme commander, the president. Soldiers move according to the commander-in-chief's orders, and military exercises can be suspended by the president's political decision. This is both the military's inherent duty and its limitation.

Since the U.S. cannot set a scenario where we invade first during drills, only defensive exercises against enemy invasion were conducted. Dr. Cho Han-beom pointed out that all counterattack procedures, a crucial part of the exercise, were omitted, comparing the drill to 'a steamed bun without red bean paste' and highlighting its limitations. This implies restrictions on improving practical combat readiness.

The U.S. also notified its intention to cancel the division-level US-ROK Marine Corps exercise scheduled for September. The reason given was that the Iran war caused disruptions in Marine Corps force operations, but Dr. Cho Han-beom raised doubts about the necessity of Marine Corps forces in a situation where there is no ground warfare in the Iran war. This leaves questions about the true reason for the exercise cancellation.

Dr. Cho Han-beom expressed a critical view of the artificial distinction between peacetime operational control and wartime operational control. He argued that operational control is essentially one, just as the police do not have separate command authority for traffic control and catching thieves. He explained that although South Korea transferred wartime operational control to the U.S. military after the establishment of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command in 1978, this was merely an artificial distinction. He emphasized the impracticality of such a distinction by citing past cases where the U.S. military held peacetime operational control. Ultimately, operational control is a highly sensitive issue directly linked to the foundation of the ROK-US alliance and sovereignty, making it difficult to approach merely by dividing periods.

The background to President Trump's sudden move towards US-DPRK dialogue was a complex interplay of domestic and international political situations. With the Ukraine war and the Iran issue facing difficulties and entanglement, Trump sought a new breakthrough. He tried to use dialogue with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un as a card to overcome his domestic political crisis, even resorting to the unconventional measure of suspending US-ROK joint exercises.

Dr. Cho Han-beom emphasized that U.S. sanctions are having a devastating impact on the North Korean economy. He stated that even with sufficient resources and human capabilities, economic development cannot be expected under U.S. sanctions. He explained the power of U.S. sanctions through examples such as Venezuela, Iran, and Cuba, adding that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is also well aware of this. He pointed out that North Korea's economic growth is represented by superficial figures focused on manufacturing, military goods, and construction, and that it has an abnormal growth structure with negative indicators for electricity, gas, and water supply. This shows that normal economic development is impossible due to sanctions.

President Trump's mention of receiving and responding to a message from Kim Jong-un suggests signs of back-channel contacts and letter exchanges between the U.S. and North Korea. Dr. Cho Han-beom analyzed that the cynical reaction of Kim Jong-un's sister, Kim Yo-jong, might actually be a strategy to lower expectations, and he believed that Kim Jong-un was still open to dialogue with Trump. This implies that an unofficial communication channel between the US and North Korean leaders is being maintained.

Chairman Kim Jong-un prefers President Trump because Trump did not label him as part of the 'Axis of Evil' and instead showed a respectful attitude. While the Republican Bush administration called North Korea the 'Axis of Evil', Trump called Kim Jong-un a 'nice guy' and his letters 'beautiful letters', attempting to build a positive relationship. Dr. Cho Han-beom analyzed that Trump is a person without a clear standard of good and evil, and from Kim Jong-un's perspective, he is the best dialogue partner who acknowledges him.

The recent omission of the phrase 'complete denuclearization' and the use of the more comprehensive term 'resolution of the Korean Peninsula issue' in US-ROK talks suggest a change in U.S. policy toward North Korea. Dr. Cho Han-beom interprets this to mean that the U.S. is open to the possibility of reaching an agreement at a 'reasonable level' in negotiations with North Korea. In other words, unlike in the past, the U.S. may not adhere only to a rigid stance on denuclearization but may seek an agreement with North Korea with a flexible attitude. This is a crucial point that could significantly impact future US-DPRK relations and security on the Korean Peninsula, even including the possibility of an agreement that South Korea does not desire.