Lee Jae-myung's Approval Rating Collapses to 30s, 40s and 50s Also Leave

According to a survey conducted by Korea Information Research from August 31 to September 1, positive evaluations of Lee Jae-myung's government stood at 34.7%, breaking the 35% line. Negative evaluations recorded 61.9%, with a strong veto sentiment evident as nearly 48% of respondents answered 'very poor.'

These figures show a continuous decline in Lee Jae-myung's government approval rating since its inception, with even core supporters showing signs of leaving.

Following the 20s and 30s generations turning their backs on Lee Jae-myung's government, a clear trend of even the core supporter base, the 40s and 50s generations, leaving has emerged. This has led to an increase in negative opinions about the government among centrists and undecided voters.

This exodus of supporters appears to stem from growing dissatisfaction with Lee Jae-myung's government's livelihood policies and various internal party issues.

Generally, ARS (Automated Response System) public opinion polls tend to be answered mainly by 'highly engaged voters' who have a strong interest in politics. On the other hand, centrists often do not answer ARS calls or hang up immediately, leading to criticisms that they are not sufficiently reflected in the survey results.

Therefore, the actual perceived approval rating of Lee Jae-myung's government is likely lower than the ARS poll numbers currently being released, suggesting that dissatisfaction among non-highly engaged political groups is even greater.

The reason for the highest negative evaluation of Lee Jae-myung's government among people in their 30s is attributed to this period being when they start families, buy homes, and accumulate assets. In contrast to those in their 20s and teens who have not yet fully entered society, those in their 30s directly feel the real economic pressure from housing costs and rising prices.

People in their 30s, who are at a critical turning point in life with marriage, home purchases, and child-rearing, have high demands for economic stability. However, they feel that the current government's policies are blocking these paths to asset accumulation, leading to increased dissatisfaction.

Criticisms have emerged that the positive effects of government aid provided by Lee Jae-myung's government on people's livelihoods are minimal. For example, even if one receives 200,000 won in aid, if rent increases by 300,000 won, the household burden actually increases. This more than offsets any savings in household expenditure from the aid.

Furthermore, there are criticisms that government aid policies have actually caused inflation, raising the prices of essential expenditures like academy fees and postpartum care center costs. The actual perceived inflation far exceeds the aid amount, indicating that the economic difficulties of ordinary people persist.

This situation raises questions about the effectiveness of Lee Jae-myung's government's livelihood policies and is cited as one of the main reasons for the decline in approval ratings.

When Lee Jae-myung's government took office, the average transaction price of real estate in Seoul was 1.38 billion won. However, it has now risen to 1.6 billion won, showing a sharp increase of 220 million won in just one year.

This steep rise in real estate prices causes significant frustration for the 30s and 40s generations aiming to buy homes and further exacerbates dissatisfaction with the government's real estate policies.

The driving force of a government's support tends to start with centrists and expand to core supporters. Generally, if centrists collapse, the government loses its momentum, and if core supporters collapse, the government itself faces a crisis. In Lee Jae-myung's government's case, the departure of centrists, primarily among the 20s and 30s, is already complete.

The 40s and 50s generations are classified as core supporters who are sensitive to economic issues directly linked to household income, and their departure is accelerating. Internal conflicts within the Democratic Party and the process of factional purges are also contributing to the dissatisfaction of core supporters. This exodus of core supporters signifies a severe weakening of Lee Jae-myung's government's support base.

A poll has revealed that even the 'Young Forty' generation, those in their 40s, have completely turned their backs on Lee Jae-myung's government. Notably, only 3.4% were undecided, indicating that most 40-somethings have shifted to negative evaluations like 'doing poorly' or 'very poorly.'

This signifies a rapid increase in negative public opinion among those in their 40s towards Lee Jae-myung's government. If the current decline in approval ratings continues, it is projected that it could fall into the 20% range as early as September.

Among the children of the 40s and 50s generations, i.e., those in their teens and 20s, a phenomenon of mocking Democratic Party supporters is spreading. This causes political orientation conflicts within families, leading to situations where parents scold their children with remarks like, 'No matter what, how can you be so critical of a specific party?'

This phenomenon demonstrates a strengthening anti-Democratic Party sentiment among the youth, which could also influence the political orientation of future voter generations.

Critical public opinion towards Lee Jae-myung's government is not limited to specific age groups but is spreading across all generations. In the 40s, 66% expressed negative opinions, meaning two out of three criticized Lee Jae-myung's government, and among the 50s, a majority of 55.1% gave negative evaluations.

Even among the 60s and 70s generations, negative evaluations around 59% indicate that a critical view of Lee Jae-myung's government is a general trend. This suggests that state administration is difficult if solely reliant on specific support bases.

In regional polls, negative evaluations of Lee Jae-myung's government in Seoul reached 70.2%. This is higher than Chungcheong (64.9%), Daegu-Gyeongbuk (64.3%), and Incheon-Gyeonggi (63%). It was confirmed that anti-government sentiment in Seoul is even stronger than in Daegu-Gyeongbuk (TK), a traditionally conservative stronghold.

As the Seoul region is considered a leading indicator of national public sentiment, the high negative evaluations in Seoul demonstrate that the national alienation from Lee Jae-myung's government is deepening.

Even in the Honam region, traditionally a strong support base for the Democratic Party, negative evaluations of Lee Jae-myung's government recorded 35.3%. While positive evaluations stood at 61%, this is an unusually high negative figure considering it is only 15 months into the administration.

Lee Jae-myung's government had even put forth a large-scale regional pledge of 800 trillion won for Honam ahead of the Democratic Party's national convention, yet it seems to have failed to restore public sentiment. This implies growing dissatisfaction and disappointment with Lee Jae-myung's government even within the Honam region.

The phenomenon of Honam public sentiment turning away, which was unimaginable in the past, can be interpreted as a significant sign that Lee Jae-myung's government's support base is weakening overall.

It has been pointed out that the ultimate responsibility for recent controversies involving Yong Hye-in, Kim Seung-won, and Kim Yong-beom lies with Lee Jae-myung's government. As the right to nominate ministerial candidates rests with the President, Lee Jae-myung's government is responsible for nominating problematic candidates.

While some are attempting to shift responsibility solely to individual candidates through 'tail-cutting' tactics, this is an attempt to evade the fundamental issue and should be guarded against.

Criticism has emerged that the cabinet reshuffle, undertaken by Lee Jae-myung's government to overcome declining approval ratings, is instead exacerbating controversies. While cabinet reshuffles are typically used as a reversal card for a government, Lee Jae-myung's government is repeatedly making problematic appointments by selecting only flawed candidates.

This situation is being likened to pouring gasoline on a fire, and criticisms of personnel failures are growing, with 28 women's organizations also pointing out the lack of expertise of the nominated candidates.

Candidate Yong Hye-in is being criticized for a lack of expertise in women's issues. Furthermore, due to her past activities as a member of the Youth Left, 'pro-North Korea controversies' continue to be raised concerning her and her spouse.

Budget execution issues of the Basic Income Party have also come under scrutiny. Criticisms have arisen that no budget was allocated for youth or women, raising questions about the actual commitment to solving women's and youth issues.

While the intention behind Lee Jae-myung's government nominating candidate Yong Hye-in as the head of the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family may have been good, controversy has arisen regarding whether the candidate's actual abilities and expertise are suitable for the position. Figures like former Justice Party lawmaker Jang Hye-young were mentioned as alternatives.

Former lawmaker Jang Hye-young is known to have a strong interest in disability rights due to a disabled sibling in her family and has also spoken out about sexual harassment she experienced within the party, showing interest in feminist rights. This has led to comparisons with Yong Hye-in's expertise. Criticisms followed that Yong Hye-in's emphasis on a 'working mom' image alone is insufficient to fully qualify her as the head of the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family.

Criticism has been raised against candidate Yong Hye-in for emphasizing her 'working mom' image by bringing her child to the National Assembly. This action is being criticized as mere 'showmanship,' given that ordinary working mothers cannot bring their children to work or enjoy special working environments like National Assembly members.

Instead of finding empathy, actual working mothers are expressing a critical view, seeing Yong Hye-in's actions as leveraging parliamentary privileges. This leads to accusations of show-off political behavior detached from the reality of ordinary citizens.

Candidate Yong Hye-in, who in the past strongly criticized government budget waste during parliamentary audits, saying 'the people's precious tax money,' is now embroiled in a 'whataboutism' controversy after it was revealed she paid her husband a salary with public funds. This action contradicts her past statements and is drawing criticism as hypocritical.

The controversy intensified with a remark from Assemblywoman Na Kyung-won, who pointed out Yong Hye-in's husband's salary issue, stating, 'She refused to give up 1.1 billion won in budget.' It was noted that Yong Hye-in's employment of her husband as an aide and payment of his salary during her term as a proportional representative legislator was no different from the 'waste of public funds' she had criticized in the past.

Furthermore, Yong Hye-in's past statements, where she emphasized fairness and morality with strict standards for others during hearings, are being re-examined, leading to widespread criticism of her double standards. This 'whataboutism' political behavior is identified as one of the main reasons for growing public distrust.

This controversy is acting as a factor causing even core supporters of Lee Jae-myung's government to turn their backs, significantly impacting approval ratings.