US-Saudi 123 Agreement Submitted to Congress… What Are the Implications for Korea?

Uranium enrichment and reprocessing have long been critical issues in nuclear negotiations between South Korea and the United States. Despite faithfully fulfilling its nuclear non-proliferation obligations, South Korea has faced restrictions on related technologies. However, the recent signing of the 123 Agreement between Saudi Arabia and the United States has opened up the possibility of uranium enrichment for Saudi Arabia, posing important questions for South Korea. The host raised the issue of fairness, asking, “Why Saudi Arabia and not South Korea?”

The host stated, “Finally, on July 22, the United States and Saudi Arabia signed the 123 Agreement.” This is understood to be a follow-up to a prior agreement at the summit level between the two countries, leading to the final signing after practical procedures.

The host explained, “It's not about nuclear exports themselves, and unlike the UAE, the 'Gold Standard' clause, which renounces research into enrichment and reprocessing, has not been confirmed.” This implies that Saudi Arabia has not completely abandoned uranium enrichment and reprocessing, leaving open the possibility, and is interpreted as a sign of flexibility in U.S. non-proliferation principles.

The issue of Saudi Arabia's nuclear fuel cycle autonomy is expected to be a major topic during the congressional review process.

This Saudi agreement suggests a change in the non-proliferation principles the U.S. has adhered to. The host pointed out, “One of the most important principles has been shaken. What is it? The fundamental principle prohibiting enrichment and reprocessing has been shaken.” Previously, the 'Gold Standard' model, which completely abandoned enrichment and reprocessing, was applied in the agreement with the UAE. However, in the Saudi model, this prohibition principle was applied flexibly, securing strategic flexibility by not completely closing the door on nuclear fuel cycle autonomy.

It appears that the mandatory clause for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol was excluded from the U.S.-Saudi 123 Agreement. The host explained, “They didn't mandate the IAEA Additional Protocol. Instead, they decided to do it through bilateral measures between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.” This indicates Saudi Arabia's intention to pursue nuclear activities through bilateral safety measures with the U.S. instead of comprehensive IAEA verification. It also suggests a strategic decision by the U.S. to conduct cooperation in sensitive technological areas with Saudi Arabia under its own consent.

The Saudi 123 Agreement has complex political and diplomatic motivations beyond mere economic viability. The host analyzed, “This has absolutely nothing to do with economics. What is it then? Four things. What are they? Entrenchment within the American bloc.” Key reasons include countering China and Russia's entry into the Middle Eastern nuclear power market and balancing the nuclear order in the region in response to Iran's nuclear threat. Additionally, securing the Saudi market for U.S. nuclear power companies and stabilizing the Middle East through normalization of relations with Israel are also considered important goals.

Furthermore, the U.S. goal of reshaping the Middle East order through normalization of relations with Israel also influences Saudi Arabia's desire for nuclear fuel cycle autonomy.

South Korea is an allied nation that has already signed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol and has decades of experience operating nuclear power plants, building world-class nuclear industry capabilities. The panelists emphasized, “We have already signed. What is it? Korea is already an ally, a nuclear power state, and an implementer of the IAEA Protocol. Completely different from Saudi Arabia. We have operated nuclear power plants for decades, built a world-class nuclear industry, and have large nuclear fuel demands.” While Saudi Arabia demands nuclear fuel cycle autonomy, mentioning the possibility of nuclear armament, South Korea faces a dilemma with restrictions on enrichment and reprocessing under strict non-proliferation principles.

The Saudi Arabian case provides South Korea with significant leverage in nuclear negotiations with the United States to secure enrichment and reprocessing rights. The panelists pointed out, “The biggest thing the Saudi case has given us is not an enrichment facility, but logic itself. Logic. Political fairness. Why does Saudi Arabia have future options open while Korea is strictly restricted?” This will expand the justification for South Korea to assess whether exceptions are applied to U.S. non-proliferation policy and to raise legitimate fairness issues regarding why strict standards are still applied to its ally, South Korea. Consequently, the Saudi case has laid the groundwork for elevating enrichment and reprocessing discussions to a crucial agenda item in U.S.-Korea nuclear cooperation.

Unilaterally trying to use issues requiring U.S. consent and cooperation as leverage carries risks.

The more South Korea demands nuclear-related items from the United States, such as nuclear submarines, enrichment, and reprocessing, the more likely the U.S. is to raise the price of negotiations. The panelists warned, “The more we demand nuclear subs, enrichment, and reprocessing from the U.S., the more the U.S. raises the price. Then, the U.S. can demand various things like investment in the U.S., shipbuilding cooperation, broad trade, and participation in nuclear power projects.” This means that as South Korea's demands intensify, the U.S. could make various additional demands, including increased investment in the U.S., strengthened shipbuilding cooperation, increased defense spending, and participation in U.S. nuclear power projects. Short-term trade negotiations and long-term, sensitive nuclear negotiations, spanning decades, are different in nature, so combining these agendas could lead to unforeseen cost increases.