ROK-US Alliance Surprise Declaration… Changes in USFK Landscape

It is understood that this drill focused only on defensive training.

Professor Kim Jong-dae pointed out, "Only a part was done, only defensive training, and no counterattack training was conducted."

These drills are actively taking place in the waters southeast of Jeju Island.

The US has expressed its intention to manage North Korean and Chinese issues with separate strategies, unlike before, by not bundling them as one package. This is interpreted as a stance to keep the door open for dialogue with North Korea while continuing to pressure China.

Professor Kim Jong-dae analyzed, "The US has now expressed its intention to manage North Korean and Chinese issues with separate strategies, unlike before when they were managed as one package." It is time to confirm whether the central axis of the ROK-US alliance is shifting.

Correspondent Kim Min-seok pointed out, "It's not just a fight between Russia and Ukraine. North Korea's ballistic missiles are going to Russia, and Russia is actually using North Korean missiles to attack Ukraine."

Cheongung-2 is a key asset of the Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) system, a weapon system that has been deployed for real-world use to defend against North Korean missiles. Correspondent Kim Min-seok emphasized, "If a core weapon system developed and deployed by South Korea to defend against North Korean missiles is sent to Ukraine, a gap could occur in the air defense network on the Korean Peninsula itself."

The outflow of key air defense assets could create a security vacuum on the Korean Peninsula, raising the possibility that this could set a precedent for demands for South Korea to share the global security burden.

This is evaluated as an unconventional approach without prior coordination with North Korea.

Professor Kim Jong-dae analyzed, "Isn't Trump trying to pull in North Korea to escape the quagmire of Iran?" North Korea's changed calculations since the 2019 Hanoi summit are also a variable to consider.

Despite former President Trump expressing dissatisfaction with the suspension of ROK-US combined exercises, President Yoon Suk-yeol expressed unexpected deference. The Ministry of National Defense maintains that the suspension of the exercises "doesn't matter."

Professor Kim Jong-dae stated, "It doesn't matter. All the important drills were done in the previous exercises, and the subsequent exercises have no assessment for the transfer of wartime operational control, and the Korean military can do that on its own." This indicates that important drills have already been conducted, and subsequent drills can be sufficiently performed by the Korean military itself.

There are no demands related to semiconductor investment, and North Korea also appears indifferent to Trump's proposal.

Professor Kim Jong-dae diagnosed, "So, neither North nor South Korea's calculations align with Trump." This suggests that Trump is acting spontaneously without a clear strategic approach to the Korean Peninsula issue.

At the same time, China is maintaining a strong stance on the Taiwan issue, even imposing entry bans related to visits by South Korean lawmakers to Taiwan.

This situation exacerbates the uncertainty of the situation on the Korean Peninsula. The Korean Peninsula issue is expected to remain in a stalemate for some time.

The Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) exercise period was shortened from 11 days to 5 days, and counterattack operations were excluded. The essence of the UFS exercise is to defend against an enemy attack and then complete a counterattack, but in this exercise, counterattacks were not carried out under control.

Professor Kim Jong-dae criticized, "The essence of the UFS exercise is to defend against an enemy attack and then complete a counterattack. Counterattacks were not controlled." This raises concerns that it could expose the realistic limitations of defense in the event of a surprise attack. Disagreements between ROK-US experts regarding the assessment of wartime operational control transfer were also exposed.

Despite the shortened exercise period, assessments related to the transfer of wartime operational control will proceed as scheduled. Most of the assessment consists of command post exercises (CPX).

Professor Kim Jong-dae said, "The schedule related to wartime operational control has not changed, but only the scenario of counterattacking and pushing back the North Korean forces during their attack could not be performed." Doubts are being raised among experts about the absence of actual maneuver training.

This shows a gap in the timing of the OPCON transfer.

Professor Kim Jong-dae explained, "South Korea wants an early transfer in the second half of 2027, and USFK Commander Bronson mentioned the first quarter of 2029, so there is also a gap here."

The possibility that the US may use the early return of wartime operational control as a bargaining chip is also raised. It is necessary to understand US intentions through past cases, such as the issue of defense cost-sharing for USFK during the Trump administration.

This is a complex situation that requires simultaneous consideration of strengthening South Korea's security sovereignty and maintaining the stability of the ROK-US alliance. Agreement on the timing of the transfer and ensuring the linkage of actual training are important.