U.S. Moves to Restrict Visas for Anti-American Journalists and Filmmakers

The U.S. is moving to sanction leftist journalists, which is expected to significantly impact South Korean leftist journalists. Analysts suggest that journalists from major domestic media outlets such as MBC, JTBC, Hankyoreh, and Kyunghyang, who have engaged in anti-American propaganda, could be targeted. This measure is expected to be a major blow to those who have yearned for the U.S. while simultaneously publishing anti-American reports.

It has been pointed out that there are many hypocritical leftists in South Korea who only verbally denounce the U.S. but secretly wish to go there, manage assets in the U.S., and send their children to study abroad. The U.S. has adopted various sanction policies to prevent such individuals from entering the country, and this time, it is targeting journalists. This goes beyond mere entry restrictions, carrying the meaning of sanctioning hypocritical behavior.

Reuters reported, citing U.S. Daily Signal, that the U.S. State Department is pushing to strengthen and expand existing social media verification requirements for general visa screenings to apply to more types of visa applicants. This plan includes journalists, suggesting that obtaining a U.S. visa will become more stringent for journalists in the future. This indicates that identity and ideological verification will be reinforced for all aspiring U.S. entrants.

All individuals applying for a U.S. visa must mandatorily submit their social media account information and set access permissions for all posts to public. Failure to submit this information, or if false information is detected during the U.S. government's internal investigation using artificial intelligence and big data, may result in a permanent ban on U.S. visa issuance. This demonstrates the U.S.'s strong commitment to thoroughly checking applicants' online activity history during the visa screening process.

Visa screening enhancement measures, previously not applied to I-visas for journalists, will be expanded through this policy change. The State Department is pushing for mandatory social media verification for journalists, foreign correspondents, camera operators and editors, producers, filmmakers, and other media professionals. The I-visa allows for reporting and newsgathering activities within the U.S., and permits not only the journalist but also their spouse and unmarried children under 21 to reside in the U.S. under the same status. As most journalists from mainstream domestic media currently dispatched as foreign correspondents in the U.S. reside with their families, this measure is expected to significantly impact the living conditions of correspondents in the U.S.

If the Trump administration, which has declared war on anti-Americanism, anti-Trump sentiments, pro-China positions, and communism worldwide, strengthens social media verification for I-visas, a significant number of domestic journalists who have engaged in such activities are expected to face visa restrictions. This suggests that the Trump administration's strong security and foreign policy stance will be reflected in visa screenings, and there is a high probability that these journalists' activities in the U.S. will be curtailed.

Social media posts by journalists, most of which are set to public and have many followers, even if deleted in the past, can remain as big data, copied by web archiving sites or others, and be caught by artificial intelligence (AI) verification. This means that not only current posts will be reviewed, but all past online activity records will be tracked and verified. Therefore, analysts suggest that simply deleting posts will likely not be enough to avoid verification.

This intensified social media verification measure is scheduled to be expanded to include not only the correspondent themselves but also accompanying staff such as camera operators, photojournalists, and editors. Furthermore, filmmakers will also be subject to verification. In South Korea, many blockbuster anti-American films have drawn over ten million viewers, and certain directors tend to focus on producing such films. A warning has been issued that these individuals may find it difficult to visit the U.S., for instance, to attend the Academy Awards. This is interpreted as an intention by the U.S. to discourage anti-American activities by penalizing the production of anti-American content itself. The U.S. is sending a message: 'Don't come to the U.S. if you're going to make anti-American films or write anti-American articles.'

Experience as a Washington or New York correspondent has served as an important ladder for social mobility for journalists in South Korea. Many politician-journalists have received nominations for proportional representation in the National Assembly or become Cheong Wa Dae spokespersons based on this reputation, making it one of the key political entry routes. This strengthening of visa screening suggests that it could also bring changes to these traditional career paths.

When dispatched as a U.S. correspondent, journalists can bring their children under the age of 21. This was one of the important reasons many journalists preferred correspondent postings, as it allowed their children to attend school in the U.S., gaining an advantage in English acquisition and U.S. university admission. It offered significant benefits for family stays in the U.S. by solving child education issues. However, concerns are now being raised that these benefits may become difficult to enjoy due to the strengthened visa measures.

It is predicted that the dreams of U.S. correspondent postings for journalists who have engaged in anti-American activities, written anti-American articles, incited, and spread fake news will be dashed by this intensified visa screening. This is interpreted as both holding them accountable for past actions and reflecting the U.S.'s intention to curb future anti-American activities. As a result, many journalists may find themselves having to reconsider their career paths.

The situation of Gwangju Air Base, selected as the site for a semiconductor cluster, being displaced without a new home, was mentioned. The Lee Jae-myung administration decided to build a semiconductor cluster at Gwangju Airport in the Honam region and to relocate the airport's main functions to Muan International Airport. However, in this process, various difficulties have been encountered in relocating the military airport, raising concerns that the semiconductor cluster development plan may face setbacks.

Muan County stated that relocating the military airport functions to Muan International Airport is difficult, citing three so-called preconditions. Muan County's conditions are as follows: First, relocate the civilian airport first, and then the military airport later. Second, financial support of 1 trillion won for regional development and resident consensus. Third, establish the Muan National Industrial Complex. Due to these preconditions, it is uncertain when the military airport relocation can begin. Additionally, it was pointed out that Muan County's promotion of eco-friendly energy industries could hinder normal military operations.

The recent case of Samsung Electronics' semiconductor factory constructed in Pyeongtaek Godeok District was presented. This factory, with all infrastructure including power, water, roads, and land perfectly in place, took two years from the start of construction to beginning semiconductor production. This demonstrates the immense time and preparation required for semiconductor factory construction, providing a basis for predicting how much time the Gwangju military airport relocation and semiconductor cluster development will realistically take.

The 1st Fighter Wing is stationed at Gwangju Air Base, performing T50 and TA50 training and combat missions. To relocate this wing and its aircraft, extensive new infrastructure must be built, including hangars, maintenance facilities, as well as living and training spaces for the personnel. Moving a military base is not something that can be done in a short period; it is a complex process that requires vast time and cost. It has been pointed out that the currently proposed simultaneous relocation and construction plans are unrealistic.

According to a Donga Ilbo report, the relocation of the 1st Fighter Wing from Gwangju Air Base is expected to take at least three years. This means the military airport could only be relocated by 2029, and actual construction of the semiconductor cluster site could only begin from 2029. It has been pointed out that even if the South Korean and U.S. forces relocate, site preparation could only start from 2029, making the plan to produce semiconductors by 2030 or 2031 realistically impossible. This highlights a significant discrepancy between the timelines for military airport relocation and semiconductor factory construction.

If Gwangju military airport relocates to Muan, the Muan County Council urged three preconditions. First, the civilian airport must be established first, and the military airport should relocate later. Second, a 1 trillion won financial support, or 'consolation money'/'commission,' is demanded for regional development and resident consensus. Third, the military airport should move in after the Muan National Industrial Complex is established. These demands from the Muan County Council reflect strong local public opinion and vested interests regarding the military airport relocation, foreshadowing difficulties for the relocation project.

It was pointed out that if a offshore wind power complex is built in front of Muan Airport, a military problem could arise where cruise missiles launched from China or North Korea could be blocked by the wind turbine propellers, making radar detection difficult. This would create a situation where the base would be exposed to missile attacks without defense, making it impossible for the military to enter. It was raised that this would force the military to abandon the relocation itself, similar to how F-16 fighter jets from Kunsan Air Base moved to Osan.

The completion of a 257,000 pyeong solar power site in Gunsan and the planned expansion of an additional 660,000 pyeong were mentioned, along with past F-16 fighter jet crash incidents. This is because reflected light from solar panels can obstruct pilots' vision during landing. Especially if relocating to Muan, where there would be more training pilots than veteran pilots, the risk of accidents could further increase. Training pilots find it difficult to overcome the 'eye-blinding' phenomenon caused by reflected light, so serious safety issues could be raised.

It was pointed out that this act destroys the cradle of Korean Air Force fighter pilot training and important assets that U.S. forces could use. It was also emphasized that the semiconductor industry needs to be concentrated to ensure price competitiveness and time competitiveness through smooth logistics and support. However, if the military airport is relocated and industrial complexes are separated as currently planned, price competitiveness will decrease, logistics costs will rise, and it will take longer. This will ultimately degrade industrial competitiveness and destroy national security, criticized as an action beneficial only to the enemy.