South Korea-France Nuclear Cooperation Unrelated to Nuclear Submarine Fuel

This cooperation aims for collaboration in commercial enriched uranium and nuclear fuel reprocessing.

CEO Lee Jeong-yoon stated, “Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power and a company called Orano, which deals with enrichment and nuclear fuel reprocessing, signed an LOI, a Letter of Intent.”

CEO Lee Jeong-yoon mentioned, “The government also happened to notify the IAEA that it had begun discussions regarding nuclear-powered submarines.”

CEO Lee Jeong-yoon explained that South Korea has not acquired nuclear fuel for submarines, but rather created a channel to discuss commercial uranium enrichment cooperation with the French company Orano.

The IAEA has also not approved South Korea's nuclear submarine project or fuel use.

This article specifies the procedure for not applying safeguards when nuclear material is used for military activities other than nuclear weapons.

CEO Lee Jeong-yoon said, “Article 14 is a provision that exempts inspections in cases of military use.” Based solely on publicly available data, it is not possible to conclude that nuclear fuel supply is guaranteed or military use is approved.

The President's visit to France and summit on September 6, the IAEA discussion notification on September 7, and the signing of the Orano LOI on September 8 were announced consecutively.

CEO Lee Jeong-yoon said, “The President visited France and held a summit. That happened on September 6, and on September 7, the IAEA officially disclosed it.” Linking these series of announcements to securing nuclear submarine fuel is a premature interpretation.

The United States agrees on the necessity of nuclear-powered submarines but has not agreed to the specific transfer of nuclear fuel. CEO Lee Jeong-yoon commented, “The U.S. clearly stated its understanding of the necessity for South Korea to build nuclear-powered submarines... However, the conditions do not align. So, it seems there's no further progress.”

Cooperation with France can be interpreted as a diplomatic signal to pressure the U.S., but it is far from an actual military nuclear fuel transfer.

This cooperation appears to be a commercial contract discussion aimed at reducing dependence on Russia and diversifying South Korea's nuclear power plant fuel supply chain.

CEO Lee Jeong-yoon stated, “It is a long-term cooperation for enrichment. The percentage of this enrichment has not yet been disclosed. That is, it has been disclosed that a commercial contract discussion has taken place to diversify South Korea's nuclear power plant fuel supply chain by reducing reliance on Russia. But whether it's for nuclear submarines or not has not been disclosed.” Nuclear fuel cycle cooperation and securing nuclear submarine fuel should be viewed as separate issues.

Unreasonably pursuing the development of nuclear-powered submarines independently under the pretext of securing nuclear sovereignty is undesirable. CEO Lee Jeong-yoon pointed out, “To secure nuclear sovereignty, we should not seek approval from anyone. So, our intention to proceed independently is good, but why should we seek approval? If we proceed independently, given existing agreements, we will face considerable economic and diplomatic pressure.”

Prematurely pursuing research without approval procedures, such as the ROK-U.S. Atomic Energy Agreement, carries the risk of significant economic and diplomatic pressure. Commercial enrichment and military fuel differ in terms of use approval and performance verification stages, requiring a cautious approach.

South Korea has a civilian agreement with the United States for peaceful uses, meaning an obligation for U.S. origin exists for the design and use of specification codes for anything related to nuclear power plants, including nuclear submarines. This implies that South Korea must recognize the U.S.'s right to consent regarding U.S.-origin materials, equipment, technology, and their derivatives or substitutes.

CEO Lee Jeong-yoon explained, “We have a peaceful use agreement with the United States. This is a civilian agreement, not a military one. There is a U.S. origin obligation. That is, regarding nuclear power plants, whether it's a nuclear submarine or anything else, when we design and use applicable specifications and codes, the U.S.'s right to consent regarding U.S.-origin materials, equipment, technology, and their derivatives or substitutes can be attached.” This is the same logic as in the past when U.S. consent was required for the use of Russian uranium.

Therefore, even if uranium is supplied from France, U.S. consent is still required for its final conversion to military use.

This means that military nuclear material is not monitored.

CEO Lee Jeong-yoon said, “There are things that IAEA Article 14 cannot resolve. It does not apply safeguards to nuclear material used for military purposes. To put it another way, it means military nuclear material is not monitored. It is excluded from safeguards.” Therefore, it is important to be wary of the misunderstanding that military activities are permitted based on Article 14.

Even if nuclear material is supplied from France, obtaining military conversion consent from France and the United States is essential to convert it for military use. Such consent is necessary for South Korea to manufacture and load fuel and operate nuclear submarines in accordance with the Article 14 agreement.

CEO Lee Jeong-yoon emphasized, “France must supply nuclear material and France and the U.S. must give consent for military conversion. Only then can South Korea manufacture and load fuel and operate the nuclear submarine according to the Article 14 agreement.” IAEA Agreement Article 14 does not extinguish the consent rights of the U.S. and France.

France has not promised nuclear submarine fuel supply, and the IAEA has not authorized fuel use but is merely in the discussion stage.

In the South Korea-France nuclear cooperation, South Korea gained the option to diversify its civilian enriched nuclear fuel supply chain, which it intends to use as a diplomatic card to pressure the United States. South Korea has only gained a symbolic effect, appearing to have a potential path to nuclear submarine fuel.

CEO Lee Jeong-yoon stated, “South Korea has gained the option to diversify its civilian enriched nuclear fuel supply chain. It is independently considering this as a diplomatic card to pressure the U.S. It has only gained the symbolism of appearing to have nuclear submarine fuel potential.” In contrast, France's Orano gained substantial benefits by securing South Korea as a long-term client, creating demand for its large-scale enrichment facilities, expanding its entry into the South Korean nuclear power market, and laying the groundwork for joint ventures in third countries.

The pursuit of nuclear submarines under the logic of securing nuclear sovereignty risks becoming a diplomatic constraint for the nation. CEO Lee Jeong-yoon pointed out, “Receiving approval does not mean we have secured nuclear sovereignty; rather, it could become a shackles. Many things are tied up all at once. If France does not promise nuclear submarine fuel and only offers enrichment services, and South Korea is required to obtain more approvals and pay a higher price, is this truly nuclear sovereignty?”

Securing nuclear submarine fuel requires consent procedures from multiple countries and international organizations, including the U.S. (fuel transfer and military cooperation), France (final use change), and the IAEA (non-diversion assurance). In a situation where France does not promise nuclear submarine fuel but only provides enrichment services, if South Korea is demanded more approvals and compensation, this is difficult to see as true nuclear sovereignty.

Concerns have also been raised that South Korea's urgent nuclear submarine claims could accelerate France's utilization of South Korea.