Lee Jae-myung Government Approval Rating Decline: Causes and Outlook

This result comes amidst a consistent negative evaluation exceeding 50%. Specifically, the approval rating in Seoul was the lowest at 29%, and it is also trending downwards in Incheon and Gyeonggi regions, reaching 38%.

Approval ratings of 29% in Seoul and 38% in Incheon and Gyeonggi pose a significant burden on the Lee Jae-myung government. Criticism of real estate policies was the highest reason for negative evaluations at 24%, identified as a major cause for the sharp decline from the mid-60%s just four months ago. The trend of centrist approval ratings mirroring the overall approval rating suggests that real estate issues have a significant impact on public opinion.

This suggests the need for policy innovation.

Centrists, having experienced the Moon Jae-in government post-impeachment and seen expectations unmet, held much higher expectations for the Lee Jae-myung government. The failure to meet these expectations fueled disappointment and led to a decline in approval ratings. In particular, people's tangible experiences with policies like real estate acted as a core factor in the approval rating decline, and dissatisfaction with the President's manner of speaking also influenced the departure of centrists.

This is interpreted as criticism that the appointment does not meet public expectations and that personnel reorganization at the Blue House level is needed. The remark was reportedly conveyed by a reporter as a direct quote, not a personal political statement.

It is pointed out that while there may have been presidential deliberation or intent behind the nomination of Representative Yong Hye-in of the Basic Income Party, this intention was not properly conveyed or explained to the public. The original purpose behind appointing Representatives Lee Hae-min and Yong Hye-in may have been good, but the lack of a strategic approach in the public acceptance process is analyzed to have instead exacerbated the controversy. A lack of communication acted as the cause of unnecessary misunderstandings and criticism.

Even within the opposition party, there is antipathy regarding this personnel concept, especially the appointment of the Minister of Gender Equality and Family. Although it seemed intended for generational change or opposition party inclusion, there are criticisms that it is actually met with significant public aversion. Criticisms of low appeal to youth and a politically engineered appointment are raised, and concerns about similar counterproductive effects to the past case of Secretary Park Sung-min are also voiced.

Some express suspicion that Kim Eo-jun and other key figures might be hoping for 'Kim Eo-jun News Factory' cast members to enter the cabinet. Furthermore, suspicions have also been raised that there might be an intention to put forward their own people as the next presidential candidates through a decline in the government's approval rating.

Currently, opinion polls show a phenomenon where particularly core Democratic Party supporters do not respond well. This leads to an analysis that the superficial approval rating may be lower than actual public sentiment. This appears similar to the past situation during the 'internal rebellion' period when the response rate of PPP supporters was low.

It is pointed out that there is a need to motivate active supporters to participate in opinion polls. This is because while some supporters primarily react to achievements, others are sensitive to political narratives. Therefore, communication methods that stimulate civic pride, beyond simple achievement promotion, can play an important role in mobilizing the supporter base.

Some point out that blaming aides could be perceived as the President trying to evade responsibility. Citing the case of Choi Soon-sil in the Park Geun-hye administration, it was argued that the mistakes of aides also fall within the President's capabilities and scope of responsibility.

Excessive criticism from within the support base is cited as one of the reasons for the Lee Jae-myung government's declining approval rating. This is analyzed as 'broken windows theory,' where criticism from within the same camp can send a wrong signal to the public that the government is 'a target that can be touched.' Citing the analysis of former lawmaker Kim Yong-nam, the importance of internal unity is emphasized. Concerns are raised that internal criticism could inadvertently foster public distrust.

It is pointed out that there is a lack of promotion for national achievements (e.g., reaching 40,000 USD GDP). There is dissatisfaction that internal critics' harsh words are too one-sided and that commendable aspects should be praised. Political ability to manage national achievements well and effectively communicate them to the public is required. This is analyzed as a criticism regarding the disappearance of achievement news, as pointed out by a JTBC anchor.

Close aides voiced harsh criticism regarding the President's 'energy restraint' remark. They argue that purging internal rebels should be the priority, and this should be handled boldly and quickly during a revolutionary period. They believe that talk of innovation and restraint is inappropriate while internal rebels have not yet been purged. The argument is made that decisive action should be taken first while power is available.