Russia Suffers Crushing Defeat to 'Devil's Unit' in Chechen War

Russia advanced its tank units into the Chechen capital, Grozny, but this resulted in 100,000 civilians who couldn't evacuate becoming isolated in the city.

Chechen forces hidden on building rooftops rained machine-gun fire on the Russian troops, and the Russian tank units were virtually annihilated, suffering massive casualties from the beginning.

This memory was etched into the Chechen people as a trauma that Russia tried to annihilate them entirely, and it was never properly healed even during the Soviet era.

Moscow considered Chechnya's declaration of independence not as a dissolution of the Soviet Union but as an internal territorial split within Russia, and thus denied its independence.

Russia feared that if Chechnya's independence was recognized, it would lead to a chain of independence attempts by other minority autonomous republics such as Tatarstan, Bashkiria, Dagestan, and Ingushetia.

Furthermore, the North Caucasus region where Chechnya is located is a crucial energy corridor for transporting Caspian Sea oil to the Black Sea, and Grozny, in particular, is a traditional oil industry city, making Russian control essential.

Therefore, Russia perceived Chechen independence as a matter directly linked to national security and economic interests and felt the necessity to strongly prevent it.

This decision was intertwined with complex issues: the principle of Russian territorial integrity, securing the North Caucasus energy corridor, and maintaining Yeltsin's own authority.

Islamic fundamentalism aimed for an extreme and violent independence, going beyond mere demands for autonomy, and included killing those who were not loyal to them and excluding Slavs.

President Yeltsin casually justified the armed conflict with Chechnya to the outside world by characterizing it not as a war but as a two-week police operation.

However, under the pretext of a police operation, a large force of 35,000 troops was mobilized, and even Muslim soldiers within the Russian army cooperated with Chechen forces by revealing methods to neutralize equipment, exacerbating the uncontrollable situation on the ground.

Due to a lack of administrative capacity, Chechen President Dudayev failed to issue civilian evacuation orders before the Grozny street battle, leaving approximately 100,000 civilians in the city during the fighting.

The Russian army, despite claiming a 'security operation,' also failed to prepare any measures for civilian protection, committing a serious blunder by both sides in ignoring civilian casualties.

Upon entering Grozny, Russian forces exposed their blind spots to Chechen rebels ambushed on rooftops, suffering surprise attacks.

Chechen forces used typical tactics of neutralizing lead and rear vehicles before launching concentrated attacks, leading to the encirclement and virtual annihilation of the Russian 131st Maikop Motor Rifle Brigade at the central station.

Furthermore, the lack of communication and coordination between units accelerated the organizational collapse of the Russian army, clearly demonstrating tactical failure.

The command continued operations despite shortages of food and water, failing to properly understand the situation on the ground, which demoralized the soldiers.

During the Chechen War, Russian media was under strict reporting control from the presidential administration, but some war correspondents went directly to the front lines and filmed the horrific scenes.

As the footage they captured was edited and broadcast nationwide, the Russian people finally confronted the inhumanity and brutal reality of the war, which caused a great shock throughout society.

When Chechen militants occupied the Budyonnovsk hospital in southern Russia and took hostages, the Russian Prime Minister entered into direct phone negotiations with Mashayev, the leader of the terrorists.

To ensure the safety of the hostages, the Russian government allowed the militants safe passage back to Chechnya, setting a strategic precedent for terrorists to achieve their demands.

This incident sparked criticism of the Russian government's counter-terrorism policy and encouraged similar terror attempts by Chechen militant groups in the future.

The success of the Budyonnovsk hostage crisis brought temporary gains for the Chechen rebels, but it ultimately proved to be a poison.

Russia used this incident as a strong pretext to label the Chechen resistance as 'terrorist groups' rather than 'independence fighters,' which ultimately weakened Chechnya's external support base.

During negotiations in October 1995, Russia put forward the disarmament of Chechnya as a primary condition.

Chechnya, on the other hand, demanded the complete withdrawal of Russian troops as a precondition, and neither side yielded, leading to a standoff.

These differing positions led to a stalemate in peace negotiations, making conflict resolution even more remote.

On August 31, 1996, Lebed, Secretary of the Russian Security Council, and Maskhadov, Chechen Chief of Staff, signed a peace agreement in Khasavyurt, Dagestan.

The main contents of the agreement were the immediate withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya and a ceasefire, with the final political status of Chechnya to be deferred until the end of 2001.

This agreement officially ended the First Chechen War, and Russia militarily withdrew from Chechnya.

As President Yeltsin's second term failed and social chaos intensified, public opinion formed that longed for strong order and the glory of Russia's past.

Against this backdrop, Vladimir Putin, a former KGB officer, emerged, paving the way for his ascent to power by promising a tough stance on the Chechen issue.