America's China Strategy Hidden Behind Smiles

To understand the specific details of the US-China summit, it is necessary to grasp the fundamental structure of US-China relations, which is obscured by the flashy summit scenes.

Analyses that merely discuss economic and diplomatic victories or defeats based solely on the meeting's atmosphere are nothing more than 'rumors' that miss the core. The United States and China fundamentally differ in their governing ideologies and values, making it difficult to form a relationship based on mutual trust.

In the 1940s, the U.S. considered China a partner for shaping the Asian order, and after the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, there were times when it was viewed as a security threat.

In the 1970s, a 'strategic leverage' relationship was formed with China for the common strategic goal of containing the Soviet Union. Through the establishment of US-China diplomatic relations in 1979 and China's entry into the WTO, the two countries developed into a symbiotic relationship sharing economic interests.

Pre-Trump presidents were reluctant to adopt aggressive policies toward China, fearing a deterioration of economic ties, but Trump completely shifted US-China relations to a new phase in his first term.

Trump redefined China as a 'strategic competitor' and systematically implemented substantive sanctions, including tariff pressure, advanced technology export controls, and supply chain restructuring. There is almost no bipartisan disagreement in the U.S. Congress regarding these China sanction bills.

In a second Trump administration, the strategy of containing China through overwhelming power superiority is expected to remain unchanged. The U.S. Congress maintains a consistent stance with the administration on foreign policy, and bipartisan support is seen in crafting and passing legislation to regulate China.

The U.S. strategic direction to contain China through overwhelming power superiority continues unchanged in a second Trump administration.

The U.S. aims for a strategy that completely contains China through overwhelming power superiority while avoiding direct military conflict.

To achieve this, it blocks China's expansion of influence in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, severs ties with pro-China proxy forces, reduces reliance on China for key supply chains, and widens the gap in advanced technology. The possibility of military intervention as a last resort is not ruled out.

The U.S. is intentionally weakening the influence of supranational multilateral organizations like the UN, which it once spearheaded.

Instead, the U.S. forms new alliances centered on key countries to execute its China strategy through rapid decision-making. Countries participating in this alliance are offered benefits, such as a stake in the new order, and the commonality among these small group alliances is the exclusion of China.

The U.S. is in a strategic situation to maintain economic influence over China and pursues economic interests rather than military confrontation.

The welcoming ceremony atmosphere and the handshake between the leaders at this summit are mere gossip and not the core issue.

Even if mutual economic concessions occurred at the summit, the fundamental direction of America's China strategy does not change. This should not be interpreted as the U.S. ceding leadership to China.

Only by comparing and analyzing the separately announced statements, without a joint US-China declaration, can one grasp the truth of the summit and the strategic intentions of both countries.

This summit, a continuation of the first summit, signals ongoing meetings and demonstrates the U.S. proactively setting and coordinating the agenda.

It differs from previous talks in that it has moved beyond merely agreeing on principles to a stage where those agreements are actually concretized into institutions and policies.

While the U.S. focuses on securing tangible benefits through the talks, China emphasizes its self-esteem by defining the US-China relationship.

If a joint declaration were issued, there would be a burden of officially acknowledging the other party's interpretation, so both countries made the strategic choice not to issue a joint communiqué to maintain their distinct emphases.

China intentionally omitted details related to coal imports or the trade committee, which would be favorable to the U.S., from its announcements. Conversely, analyses suggest the U.S. secured tangible gains by specifying concrete figures for coal imports and rare earth discussions in its fact sheet.

Both countries tended to intentionally exclude content from their announcements that was inconvenient for them or could be used for their domestic politics. In particular, China did not mention coal imports or trade committee-related content favorable to the U.S. in its announcement.

The establishment of the Trade Committee and Investment Committee by the U.S. demonstrates its intention to manage trade with China on an ongoing basis.

This strongly aims to bring market access and business activities in non-sensitive sectors into an institutionalized framework of negotiation. Essentially, China has been drawn into a US-led game designed since the May summit.

Unlike the past, when China was incorporated into the WTO system under a free trade policy, the U.S. now seeks to manage China through direct, institutionalized negotiation platforms.

The U.S. pointed out problems with China's structural economic practices, such as subsidies, state-owned enterprise issues, opaque regulations, intellectual property infringement, and overproduction dumping.

In the past, these issues were raised with Western allies, but effectiveness was low due to differing national interests. The second Trump administration aims to manage China by shifting these issues to a direct, one-on-one confrontation.

This represents a new approach that abandons the past method of fostering China within the free trade order, and instead seeks to correct China's economic behavior through direct control and pressure.

The two countries agreed on equal tariff reductions on non-sensitive items worth $30 billion. These items primarily involve U.S. agricultural products and medical device exports, and Chinese imports of everyday goods like toys and ornaments.

The U.S. applied psychological warfare by highlighting inventory problems for Chinese small and medium-sized enterprises through tariff pressure. This is interpreted as an intention to exert political pressure by exploiting difficulties in China's domestic market.

At the same time, the U.S. clearly showed its intention to curb the growth of China's core industries by completely excluding advanced industrial sectors like semiconductors, AI, and critical minerals from negotiations and strictly regulating them.

The U.S. continues to import low-cost manufactured goods from China to stabilize consumer prices, such as at 'dollar stores.' Furthermore, China, as the world's largest single market, serves as an important export destination for American companies.

The IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor) is a long-term vision project that can run in parallel with short-term trade policies. The U.S. pursues both its economic interests and strategic goals by employing a separation strategy: strong regulation of advanced industries alongside imports of essential low-cost consumer goods.