Slavery, Strategy, and the Civil War's Enduring Impact

Union forces, under generals like William Tecumseh Sherman and Philip Sheridan, adopted a 'hard war' strategy against the Confederacy, employing tactics in agriculturally productive areas.

This approach involved burning mills, killing livestock, and destroying crops to dismantle the Confederacy's logistical support. Sherman stated his intention to break the Confederate psychological will by demonstrating that his army could move at will throughout the South.

Unlike other nations that abolished slavery without widespread civil war, the unique scale of violence in the United States was largely due to the integration of millions of enslaved people within the population.

The Confederacy's mobilization of 85-90% of its military-aged white males was viewed as only possible because enslaved labor sustained the economy.

The Union's war aims shifted significantly in the summer of 1862; initially, the goal was to suppress the rebellion, but leadership eventually determined they could not suppress the rebellion unless they also struck at slavery.

Taking away enslaved labor was seen as a way to deal a severe blow to the Confederate economy and its capacity to wage war, making emancipation a critical military strategy.

Abraham Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation was a calculated military measure, explicitly restricted to areas still in rebellion and under Confederate control.

Lincoln asserted no constitutional power to abolish slavery in Union-controlled territories, which remained exempt from the proclamation.

The proclamation served to punish rebellious states, disrupt their war efforts by encouraging enslaved people to flee, and maintain the commitment of wary Northern Democrats to the war, who viewed it as a tool to achieve union.

This strategic framing aimed to prevent widespread political backlash among those not predisposed to supporting abolition directly.

Despite its foundational rhetoric of states' rights, the Confederate government became the most intrusive central authority in American history until well into the 20th century.

It enacted the first national conscription law, compelling military service, and implemented a graduated income tax along with a 'tax in kind' that claimed a percentage of farmers' crops.

The Confederate government also impressed private property, including horses, mules, and enslaved laborers, for state use.

These measures, essential for sustaining the protracted war effort, frequently provoked strong opposition from states' rights proponents within the Confederacy, revealing a tension between ideology and wartime necessity.

Historian Gary Gallagher suggests that without Robert E. Lee's military leadership, the Civil War could have concluded as early as the summer of 1862 with slavery still intact.

By extending the conflict through his persistent and effective resistance, Lee inadvertently compelled the Union to adopt emancipation as a war aim.

Lee's continued success and the prolonged nature of the war ultimately forced the Union to expand its objectives beyond preserving the Union to include the abolition of slavery, fundamentally altering the conflict's scope and outcome.

His resignation from the U.S. Army was to join Virginia's state forces, not directly the Confederacy, underscoring his deep regional allegiance.

Lee's loyalty to Virginia encompassed his family, social standing, and the institution of slavery, which was integral to the state's identity and his own aristocratic background.

His personal idol, George Washington, a fellow Virginian and slaveholder, likely influenced Lee's complex decision to defend his home state, even if it meant opposing the Union Washington helped create.

Historian Gary Gallagher refutes the notion that the Civil War was an inevitable outcome, emphasizing that historical events unfold through a sequence of cause and effect.

He highlights specific decisions, such as Abraham Lincoln's choice regarding Fort Sumter, as critical variables that could have altered the war's trajectory.

The conflict emerged from a series of contingent events and choices, rather than following a predetermined path, underscoring the role of individual agency in shaping history.

If a different decision had been made, the upper South states might not have seceded, potentially leading to continued political debates over slavery's expansion rather than full-scale war.

A major misconception about the Civil War is that the Union's victory was inevitable due to superior resources and population.

The Confederacy did not aim to conquer the North; its primary objective was to convince the Union's civilian population that the cost of suppressing the rebellion was too high.

From the Confederate perspective, a stalemate or a 'tie' would have been equivalent to a victory, demonstrating that the Southern states could not be forced back into the Union.

This strategy mirrored historical examples where a militarily superior force, like the United States in Vietnam, was compelled to withdraw due to a lack of public support for continued conflict.

The Battle of Shiloh, fought in early April, saw over 25,000 casualties in just two days under U.S. Grant and Confederate General Albert Sidney Johnston, exceeding all battle casualties suffered by U.S. forces in every war combined up to that point.

Following this, the Seven Days Battles at Richmond, featuring George B. McClellan's army against Lee's, resulted in an additional 36,000 casualties within two and a half months.

These engagements demonstrated the war would demand immense sacrifices and resource allocation on a totally different scale than anticipated.

Major General George McClellan's repeated defeats, particularly during the Seven Days Battles in late June and early July 1862, convinced both Congress and President Lincoln that confronting slavery was essential to winning the war.

In response to the escalating conflict and McClellan's inability to secure a decisive victory, Congress passed the Second Confiscation Act in late July, which directly targeted slavery as a measure of war.

Lincoln, having decided on emancipation, waited for a Union victory to announce his proclamation; the subsequent Union victory at Antietam on September 17, 1862, after Lee's retreat, provided the opportune moment.

Five days after Antietam, on September 22, 1862, Lincoln issued the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, strategically leveraging a military success to justify the moral and military shift in the war's objectives.

Historian Gary Gallagher places George Washington and Abraham Lincoln as virtually tied for the greatest U.S. presidents, each foundational in their own right.

Washington's legacy is defined by his unprecedented act of voluntarily relinquishing power twice: first after the Revolutionary War, and then by stepping down after two terms as president, embodying the 'citizen soldier' ideal and small-r republican virtue.

Lincoln, by contrast, is celebrated for his profound leadership during a national crisis, demonstrating an unwavering commitment to principle even when it meant making unpopular decisions, a quality not universally shared among leaders.

Both leaders' ability to shoulder immense responsibility and set critical precedents proved essential for the survival and direction of the nascent republic and its enduring challenges.

Hooker, commanding an army of 135,000 men against Lee's 64,000, was initially confident, executing a brilliant flanking maneuver around Lee's left flank.

Despite being outnumbered two to one, Lee defied conventional wisdom by dividing his army, leaving 10,000 men to hold 40,000 Federals at Fredericksburg while he and Stonewall Jackson confronted Hooker directly.

Hooker, despite his strong tactical position, lost his nerve at a critical moment on May 1st, 1863, ordering a retreat into the wilderness and ceding the initiative to Lee, which ultimately led to a Confederate victory he arguably should not have won.

This improbable triumph cemented Lee's legend, establishing a culture of risk-taking within his army that profoundly impacted subsequent campaigns like Gettysburg.

The Democratic platform for the upcoming election advocated for an armistice and negotiations, a policy widely believed to risk a permanent Confederate state and the reversal of emancipation.

The political outlook fundamentally shifted with Sherman's capture of Atlanta in early September 1864, followed by Philip Sheridan's decisive victories in the Shenandoah Valley, which ultimately secured Lincoln's reelection and continued the war effort to its conclusion.

Gary Gallagher notes that both generals were often generous in their assessments of other adversaries but notably uncharitable toward each other, a behavior he considers "ludicrous" given their respective capabilities and direct engagements.

This mutual disavowal highlights a human tendency, even among great leaders, to maintain one's own sense of military identity and perhaps a form of psychological defense against acknowledging a peer of equal or superior skill.

Booth's assassination of Lincoln on April 14, 1865, was not an isolated act but part of a larger, ultimately failed conspiracy to eliminate the top leadership of the United States, including Vice President Andrew Johnson and Secretary of State William Seward.

Earlier, Booth had plotted to kidnap Lincoln for ransom, which did not materialize.

The subsequent trial and execution of four conspirators, including Mary Surratt and the commandant of Andersonville Prison, served to quell widespread Northern demands for further retribution after Lincoln's death, bringing down the emotional temperature of the nation.

To provide heroic figures for this narrative, Robert E. Lee was elevated to an almost mythic status, largely replacing the unpopular Jefferson Davis as the symbol of Confederate virtue and gallant resistance against insurmountable odds.

This narrative, alongside the Union, Emancipation, and later Reconciliation memory streams, has profoundly shaped historical understanding and continues to reverberate in contemporary debates, such as those surrounding Confederate symbols.

Gallagher acknowledges that contemporary American society resembles the 1850s in its tendency to attribute the worst characteristics to the other side and engage in inflammatory rhetoric, but crucial differences remain.

He points out the absence of physical assaults on members of Congress within the legislative chambers and, more significantly, the lack of formal secession conventions, unlike the actions taken by Southern states in 1860 when they voted to secede and left the nation.

Ultimately, Gallagher suggests there is a real cohesion and resilience to the Union, viewing current discourse and bickering as a family Thanksgiving dinner where there is yelling but an assumption that everyone is still a family.