US-Saudi Nuclear Agreement Text Revealed… Nuclear Sovereignty Debate

As the contents of the agreement, which had previously been based only on speculation, were confirmed by the actual document, accurate, document-based analysis has become possible.

As important as whether Saudi Arabia will be allowed uranium enrichment in this agreement is the extent of U.S. control. A fundamental question arises as to whether enrichment carried out with U.S. consent can truly be seen as a full exercise of nuclear sovereignty. This could also relate to South Korea's claims of nuclear sovereignty, necessitating in-depth discussion.

This indicates that the U.S. intention to transfer sensitive nuclear technology is combined with its desire to control it.

However, such technology transfer requires the written agreement of both countries, and the form of uranium to be transferred is limited to low-enriched uranium of 5% or less. This demonstrates the U.S. position to not completely prohibit sensitive technology transfer, but to allow it restrictively under strict control.

This means that while Saudi Arabia cannot unconditionally enrich independently, it has secured room to negotiate with the U.S. on technology transfer and enrichment conditions. This is considered a step beyond the existing principle of unconditional prohibition.

Purchasing one nuclear power plant means not just acquiring equipment, but integrating into an entire ecosystem of technology, nuclear fuel, parts, and operation. If Saudi Arabia chooses U.S. technology, it will inevitably be subject to U.S. legal channels and control conditions. This can act as a means for the U.S. to strengthen post-verification and control, forming a long-term relationship of dependence.

As long as nuclear materials, equipment, and components subject to the agreement remain, key U.S. non-proliferation conditions and controls will persist. This essentially suggests that Saudi Arabia could form a permanent dependency on the U.S., linked to the lifespan of the nuclear power plant.

However, this does not mean that Saudi Arabia has secured completely autonomous rights. The binding nature of U.S. technology-based agreements and the issue of U.S. consent rights are still expected to act as practical restrictions on Saudi Arabia's nuclear activities.

This means that, separate from existing comprehensive safeguards agreements, the U.S. intends to directly verify Saudi Arabia's nuclear activities. However, the agreement text does not concretely specify the scope or detailed conditions of this additional verification, leaving room for future debate.

This nuclear agreement has the character of a diplomatic and political package beyond simple nuclear technology cooperation. In particular, analysis suggests that Saudi Arabia's participation in the 'Abraham Accords', which recognizes the state of Israel, served as a prerequisite for the nuclear agreement. This demonstrates a long-term transaction structure that complexly combines technology, security, and diplomacy.

Saudi Arabia seeks to secure access to nuclear power technology and fuel, maintain the possibility of enrichment and reprocessing, and strengthen its strategic relationship with the U.S. The U.S., on the other hand, expects to secure its domestic nuclear industry ecosystem, maintain influence over Saudi Arabia, and deter the expansion of China and Russia in the Middle East.

Due to structural constraints of reliance on U.S. technology and being under its control, the power to decide everything for oneself does not increase proportionally with possessing nuclear technology.

The agreement text does not explicitly state that Saudi Arabia's national sovereignty will be subordinate to the U.S. However, by adopting U.S. technology, it will inevitably become part of a broad network, including U.S. export controls and safety measures. As the U.S., which sets rules and controls within the nuclear order, can use this as a key means to maintain its hegemony, a thorough review of Saudi Arabia's strategic autonomy is necessary.

Rather, there is a high possibility of forming a structure dependent on the U.S., which controls technology supply and rule-setting. It is important to recognize that true power lies not in possessing nuclear weapons, but in the ability to exert influence and control within the nuclear-related network.

The more a country tries to gain autonomy by introducing nuclear technology, the more conditions it may have to negotiate with the U.S., leading to a paradoxical situation. This is similar to prey caught in a spiderweb, becoming more entangled the more it struggles. It raises fundamental questions about whether nuclear cooperation truly brings independence.

The tendency to push everything forward simply with the phrase 'securing nuclear sovereignty' can obscure the meaning of sovereignty. Blind faith that acquiring nuclear technology will solve issues of economic viability, security, and post-disposal waste must be guarded against. It is crucial to confront the control and dependency relationship with the U.S. hidden behind the packaging of 'nuclear sovereignty' and to meticulously examine the true purpose and cost of nuclear acquisition.

Just because Saudi Arabia achieved the diplomatic success of allowed enrichment, it cannot be equated with an expansion of national sovereignty. We should not take a simplistic approach like 'Saudi Arabia got it, so we should too,' but rather deeply examine what relational conditions are formed as a price for gaining rights. The ability to comprehensively judge the choice and rejection of nuclear technology is the core of true sovereignty.

True national sovereignty does not arise from possessing one more nuclear technology. Rather, sovereignty is the ability to choose necessary technologies, reject unnecessary ones, and make decisions ourselves by comprehensively judging national safety, economy, diplomacy, and security. If nuclear sovereignty leads to deeper dependence on the United States, it could become a serious national problem.