Why Elon Musk's Strong-Arming of India Isn't Working, and What Allies Are Doing About US Dependence

Zakaria opens with Elon Musk's public criticism of India. Frustrated that Starlink had not been cleared to launch in the country, Musk accused the government of protecting Mukesh Ambani, whose telecom network Jio is launching its own satellite service. In Zakaria's telling, Musk cast himself as the champion of ordinary Indians against one of the country's richest men.

The move backfired. India's government dismissed the accusation as baseless. An influential nationalist group close to the ruling party went further, demanding that Starlink be kept out of India altogether on national security grounds. Media and online reactions were similarly hostile to Starlink. Zakaria argues that Musk did not understand that in India, as in much of the world, trust in America is collapsing.

Zakaria says Indians have watched Donald Trump discard 25 years of bipartisan outreach to New Delhi in favor of closeness with Pakistan and its de facto leader, Field Marshal Asim Munir. They have also watched Trump essentially abandon Ukraine, where the military version of Starlink has been suspiciously restricted, which Zakaria says crippled Ukraine's military response to Russian aggression.

Zakaria then asks a question for India: if it found itself in another crisis with Pakistan, would it want its armed forces to be utterly dependent on a US satellite system controlled by Trump and Musk?

Zakaria recalls that after World War II, the United States achieved something close to a geopolitical miracle: Japan and Germany became the second and third most powerful economies on Earth, yet neither sought nuclear weapons or the ability to defend itself alone. Both aligned their security policy with Washington and entrusted their ultimate defense to American soldiers and American nuclear weapons.

He notes how unusual this was, since great powers have historically built armies to counter the top power. America's allies agreed to depend on it for survival, he says, not because America was invariably wise or generous, but because the international system it created also benefited the United States. Zakaria concludes that American power was formidable, but American trust was priceless, and that trust is disappearing.

Zakaria cites a Pew Research Center survey conducted this year, which found that in 26 of 35 countries, China was viewed more favorably than the United States.

He points to specific declines in US allies: favorable views of the US in South Korea fell from 77% in 2024 to 45% this year. The figure for Japan fell from 70% in 2024 to about half.

Zakaria turns to Canada. Prime Minister Mark Carney visited Beijing to rebuild commercial ties and moved to bind Canada more closely to Europe, including through European defense financing.

Zakaria says that these efforts to loosen dependence on America have earned Carney's government sky-high approval ratings, even as many Western governments face populations deeply unhappy with their rule.

Zakaria says Saudi Arabia, the UAE and other American partners have suffered Iranian attacks in a war that Washington initiated. He adds that Trump has not directly helped Saudi Arabia or Qatar despite his recent commitments to do so. Some analysts in the region have begun asking whether hosting American military bases makes them safer or puts them in danger.

In August, Saudi Arabia signed a mutual defense pact with Turkey and nuclear-armed Pakistan. Zakaria also notes that in Japan, favorable views of the US fell from 70% in 2024 to just half, and that these societies still fear China and North Korea and still depend on the US. That, he says, is precisely the point: they need Washington but no longer know whether they can trust it.

Zakaria says that in Europe, Trump has repeatedly questioned whether he would defend NATO allies. Europeans have responded by boosting military spending, strengthening their own weapons industries and seeking greater strategic independence. France and Germany have created a joint group to discuss nuclear deterrence and France's arsenal, which they insist is meant to reinforce NATO, not replace it.

Zakaria acknowledges the defense of Trump's position: his supporters say he is simply forcing wealthy allies to pay for their own defense, something previous presidents also demanded. Zakaria accepts that point as fair, but argues there is an enormous difference between asking allies to shoulder more responsibility and telling them that the promise to defend them might be worthless.

Zakaria says the ultimate danger lies in nuclear weapons. In 1963, John F. Kennedy warned that the world might have 15 or 20 nuclear powers by 1975. More than eight decades after Hiroshima, however, there are only nine.

Zakaria credits arms control treaties, but argues that more crucial was the American nuclear umbrella, which spared countries such as Germany, Japan and South Korea the need to develop their own bombs.

Zakaria says this restraint is already weakening. An August survey found that 65% of South Koreans support acquiring nuclear weapons. A recent Washington Post report indicated that Saudi Arabia has not ruled out pursuing them.

He warns that as trust in America weakens further, other wealthy nations will make the same calculation, and the world will move into one of dozens of nuclear nations, with all the uncertainty and danger that brings. Zakaria concludes that Trump believes he is making allies pay their own bills, but may end up making them build their own bombs.

Zakaria reports that the week began with Trump telling reporters, "Russia, frankly, has been fine on Ukraine." The day before, he criticized Ukraine's president on social media, saying Zelensky does not want to end the war and probably never did.

Trump's special envoy, Steve Witkoff, met with both Zelensky and Putin this week and called Putin a humanitarian.

Zakaria turns to Poland's foreign minister, Radik, asking how Poland reacted to the apparent US shift toward saying Russia is doing more for peace than Ukraine. The minister says that in Poland and Europe in general, they consistently think that to end the war, more pressure must be put on the aggressor, Vladimir Putin, not on the victim. He notes that capitulation can end any war, but the conditions matter, and Ukraine must end the conflict with defensible borders and a country to which people will want to return.

Asked whether Europe has a viable strategy if the US continues on its current path, including less intelligence sharing, occasional curbs on Starlink and delays in weapons sales, the minister says the United States has not been funding Ukraine since January of last year. He says Europe has funded the full bill for sustaining the Ukrainian state, weapons deliveries and weapons production in Ukraine's defense industry.

He adds that frozen Russian assets are a card, that there have been 22 packages of sanctions on Russia, and that Russia has lost its most lucrative market for oil and gas, which is Europe itself. He interprets Sergei Lavrov's rant against Europe at the UN Security Council a couple of weeks earlier as a sign that Russia is beginning to realize Europe is a factor, financially and in terms of security, and that Europe demands a voice in how the war ends.

Asked whether Russia has aspirations beyond Ukraine, the minister says Russia is already waging a hybrid war of sorts against Poland and other European countries. He defines hybrid war as attacks just below the threshold of an actual armed invasion, but still kinetic, and says people are dying. He lists assassinations in Poland, Britain, Germany and elsewhere; arson; an attempted blowing up of a train on a high embankment that did not derail only because of the terrorists' incompetence; armed drones crossing Lithuania and being used at Leipzig airport; and a Russian cruise missile with a warhead exploding in Poland.

He also describes daily cyberattacks on hospitals, the financial system and the energy system, drone incursions, and the usual espionage and mapping of critical infrastructure at sea. He says Poland knows which unit of the GRU is doing it and believes Russia is planning to escalate.

Asked whether Europe should respond more forcefully to what appear to be Russian probes, the minister says Europe does not do the kinds of things Russia does. He says Russia has what they call "wet affairs" departments, meaning assassination squads, while Europe does not send drones or terrorists into Russia, because, he says, European countries are peaceful democracies.