Ethiopian Conflict Threatens Regional Stability

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed accused Eritrea, Sudan, and Egypt of supporting an opposition coalition, although Khartoum and Cairo have officially denied any involvement.

The situation has seen a significant diplomatic escalation, including the reciprocal expulsion of diplomats leading to severed ties between Asmara and Addis Ababa, compounded by decades of mutual distrust and the failure of previous peace efforts.

Armed groups, including the TPLF, seized control of towns in the Afar, Amhara, and Tigray regions, while the TPLF and six other groups formed a new coalition aimed at overthrowing Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.

Eritrea fears an invasion as Ethiopia openly expresses its intent to gain access to the Red Sea port of Assab, further destabilizing border security.

Ongoing disputes between Egypt and Ethiopia over Nile water sharing, particularly concerning the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, complicate diplomatic efforts, while Sudan accuses Addis Ababa of backing the Rapid Support Forces, a claim Ethiopia denies.

Magnus Taylor, Deputy Director of the Horn of Africa Project at the International Crisis Group, noted that while physical conflict is moving slowly, diplomatic friction is rising significantly.

The expulsion of Eritrean diplomats from Addis Ababa marks a key escalation in regional tensions, despite there being no direct military conflict between regional powers at present, only heightened diplomatic strain.

There are also recent allegations regarding mutual support for opposing factions between Sudan and Ethiopia.

Satellite data shows movements of RSF troops, and there are reports of drones launched from neighboring territories into Khartoum, suggesting indirect involvement from regional powers.

Egypt's involvement remains unclear but is likely limited to indirect technical support, as regional powers currently lack the fiscal capacity for massive direct warfare.

Nations are posturing to support proxy groups instead, utilizing such relationships to exert influence without direct military engagement.

Eritrea's autocratic regime prioritizes preventing the conflict from crossing into its territory, considering it a primary security objective.

The recent formation of the 'Alliance for Survival' coalition is partially driven by Eritrean security concerns, reflecting the perceived threat from the deepening Ethiopian conflict.

A growing narrative suggests a potential for the conflict to spill over from Tigray into Eritrea, a risk worsened by the long-standing diplomatic breakdown between Asmara and Addis Ababa.

The federal government made advances in Tigray after initial surprise attacks, successfully capturing key towns on the north-south highway heading toward Mekelle.

Magnus Taylor suggests that the federal military appears to have had the upper hand in the first 10 days of renewed fighting.

However, long-term stability is threatened by the formation of an internal coalition spanning half of Ethiopia's regions, indicating persistent deep-seated opposition.

However, political stability is being eroded as the country experiences a 'fraying at the margins,' indicating a broader weakening of national cohesion despite the central government's immediate security.

The latest fighting and the creation of the 'alliance for survival' highlight significant discontent and opposition to Abiy Ahmed in many parts of the country, according to Magnus Taylor.

While Abiy is expected to survive in the short to medium term, the coalition of seven distinct ethnic groups, some with histories of internal conflict, casts doubt on the long-term durability of the alliance, as many groups are reluctant to engage in armed conflict.

The coalition, formed by groups with histories of internal conflict, such as the Amhara-Tigray friction during the TPLF war, faces challenges in maintaining cohesion given the diverse motivations and reluctance among some members to engage in armed conflict.

Jervin from the Horn of Africa Project at the International Crisis Group noted that regional actors are utilizing proxies rather than direct military confrontation due to a lack of capacity for full-scale war, leading to diplomatic severances.

The Nile remains a primary flashpoint, with Egypt fearing the impact of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on its water security, especially amid climate concerns like El Niño, exacerbating long-standing disputes.

Ethiopia's push for port access, including potential interest in Assab and ties to Somaliland, has increased regional tensions and angered Somalia.

Severing diplomatic ties between neighbors significantly raises the risk of miscalculation by military forces due to closed communication channels, which prevents de-escalation and misunderstanding.

Magnus Taylor emphasized the significant lack of real leadership and deep fragmentation throughout the Horn of Africa region.

The ongoing war in Sudan, which currently has no resolution in sight, exacerbates the interconnectedness of regional conflicts and prevents a unified approach.

There is no shared agenda among neighboring countries regarding how to engage with Ethiopia, as each nation pursues its own interests, further complicated by the role of both non-state actors and individual state agencies in forming shifting alliances.

Visible camps exist around the 'R4 group' and the UAE's influence across the Middle East, Red Sea, and Horn of Africa, but viewing these as fixed structures hinders a proper understanding of the conflict's underlying dynamics.

Jervin explained that the 'Alliance of Seven' opposition groups have three primary goals: the removal of Abiy Ahmed, the establishment of a transitional government, and the initiation of a national dialogue to reconstitute the constitution.

Ethiopia faces deep-seated ethnic federalism tensions, which date back to the period from 1991 to 2018, and the Prosperity Party's attempts to unify the system under unitary characteristics have failed to resolve these underlying ethnic fractures.

The Pretoria agreement, while providing a temporary ceasefire, did not address the fundamental question of Ethiopia's post-conflict identity and governance structure, leaving key issues unresolved.

Jervin noted that even if Abiy Ahmed were removed, internal dominance by groups like the TPLF, due to their political and economic power, could lead to new splintering, as historical ethnic grievances remain a significant barrier to a cohesive national identity.

Recent U.S. policy shifts, including the lifting of arms sanctions on Eritrea and Ethiopia, raise concerns about regional human rights, as easier access to weapons may exacerbate existing violence and further destabilize the region.

Magnus Taylor explained that neighboring countries, including Sudan, generally avoid seeking a total collapse or regime change in Ethiopia, instead preferring to maintain a degree of leverage.

Regional states historically utilize relationships with opposition groups as a tool for border and resource negotiations, with engagement often serving to manage broader diplomatic relationships rather than to effect a total state overthrow, thereby preserving a managed antagonism.

Opposition groups like the Alliance for Survival are seen as unlikely to topple Abiy Ahmed, and relationships with them serve as leverage rather than a realistic regime-change strategy, allowing Eritrea to deter future Ethiopian aggression without direct confrontation.

Ahmed Sleman emphasized that the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula form a highly interconnected region where conflicts in Yemen and the Horn of Africa traverse each other, involving issues such as water rights, port access, and regional security.

The conflicts in Yemen are intertwined with the broader geopolitical struggle involving the US, Israel, and Iran, signifying that the Red Sea region is increasingly viewed as an interconnected theater rather than separate geographic zones.

GCC states, specifically Saudi Arabia and the UAE, are active players in these regional contestations, further integrating the dynamics of both sub-regions.

Frequent isolated fighting and air strikes continue to occur in the Amhara and Oromia regions of Ethiopia, despite the government previously exercising restraint to support Abiy Ahmed’s economic globalization agenda.

Jervin Naidu noted that the Ethiopian army is well-trained and well-armed, capable of holding ground and making progress against rebels, particularly through the effective use of advanced Turkish-made drones.