Lee Jae-myung's Approval Rating Continues to Decline, Core Support Base Departs Without Party Convention Effect

Democratic Party leader Lee Jae-myung's approval rating has failed to recover even after the party convention. According to a survey by the Korea Social Opinion Institute (KSI) conducted on August 18-19, negative sentiment towards Lee Jae-myung reached 61.4% among those in their 20s and 69.2% among those in their 30s. His overall approval rating also plummeted by about 5 percentage points, showing no effect of rallying support through the convention; instead, the exodus is accelerating.

This decline in approval indicates a deepening departure of those in their 40s and 50s, considered Lee Jae-myung's core support base, as well as swing voters. The high negative sentiment among the younger generation, in particular, can be interpreted as a collapse of trust rather than just a withdrawal of support.

The primary reason for Lee Jae-myung's declining approval rating can be found in the large-scale departure of his strong support base, the 4050 generation, and the alienation of swing voters. His approval rating, which stood at 54.7% in the second week of July, plunged to 42.8% in August, signifying not just a simple drop in approval but a full-scale exodus of his core supporters.

Kim Young-ho pointed out that many analysis results view this as "a result of the 4050 generation, who were the core axis of support, completely turning away," and confirmed that swing voters have also completely turned their backs.

An analysis suggests that the economic crisis, especially the surge in consumer prices, is fueling public discontent with the Lee Jae-myung government. The price of a bunch of spinach reaching 8,000 won and soaring egg prices, among other widespread high inflation, are directly impacting the daily lives of ordinary citizens. In the midst of such economic difficulties, growing disappointment with the political sphere's focus solely on internal conflicts is evident.

Joo Sung-eun emphasized, "They can only return if the economy recovers," and pointed out that the public's economic suffering is compounded by the stock market's roller coaster and real estate issues.

Even the price of gimbap, a common meal for ordinary people, has surged, further increasing the burden of consumer prices. Seonwoo Yoon-ho stated that the average price of a roll of gimbap in Seoul is 3,838 won, nearing 4,000 won, which is a 5.9% increase from a year ago.

This rise in gimbap prices is largely due to soaring egg prices and is driving up overall dining-out costs, making it even harder for ordinary citizens to make ends meet.

The government's real estate tax reforms have gone beyond simply freezing sales to causing a surge in jeonse and monthly rent prices, exacerbating housing insecurity for the 2030 generation. Joo Sung-eun pointed out that integrated monthly rent prices have risen in 166 out of 182 areas nationwide, and specifically in Seoul, monthly rent has increased by 7% in a year.

This increased burden of housing costs is stripping away opportunities for asset formation and deepening economic frustration among the younger generation.

The government's failure in real estate policy is deepening public distrust and serving as a primary cause of the decline in approval ratings. Kim Ye-young said, "If real estate policies are pursued in this manner, the entire nation will inevitably turn away," and specifically mentioned the strong opposition from the 2030 generation.

Korean Gallup survey results also indicate that real estate policy failures are a major reason for the decline in approval, and suspicions are growing that the government is allowing policies to worsen real estate problems.

As monthly rent burdens increase and housing prices continue to rise, the dream of homeownership for the younger generation is becoming increasingly distant. Kim Ye-young articulated the sense of deprivation among young people, saying, "They hope that if they save money by being frugal, they might be able to buy a house, but that hope is becoming more distant."

With high housing prices coupled with tax issues, young people are experiencing a double economic hardship, which leads to deep frustration with their reality.

An analysis suggests that public trust in the Lee Jae-myung government has shifted from the expectation of "doing a good job" to "distrust." Kim Ye-young commented, "Now, it can be interpreted that that belief has turned into distrust."

This collapse of trust is attributed to the perception that the government's actual performance does not meet public expectations, along with party conflicts like the so-called 'Myeongcheong Daejeon' (Lee Jae-myung vs. faction opposing him) causing public fatigue.

The negative evaluation rates for Lee Jae-myung among those in their 20s and 30s are extremely high, confirming a widespread departure of young people. Joo Sung-eun stated, "It's 61.4% for those in their 20s and 69.2% for those in their 30s. Those in their 30s are nearing 70% negative evaluation."

This high level of distrust among young people has persisted since the beginning of his tenure and, coupled with a sense of relative deprivation, is a key factor accelerating Lee Jae-myung's approval rating decline.

Young people suspect that the government's real estate policies, especially those focused on rental housing, are cutting off their ladder to asset formation. Joo Sung-eun analyzed that the 2030 generation feels that the situation is "not allowing them to own homes, and instead, only policies that cut off the very ladder of asset formation for the 2030 generation are being implemented."

This, combined with resistance to the perception that "owning a home leads to conservatism," and income conflict appearing higher than gender conflict in social conflict surveys, indicates that young people's dissatisfaction with economic inequality has reached its peak.

Criticism has arisen that policymakers' lack of understanding of reality and inappropriate remarks are further amplifying distrust among young people. Joo Sung-eun pointed out, "When they tell young people to live simply in old buses while they themselves own multiple prime properties in Gangnam and send their children to study abroad, how can young people's hearts return?"

The controversy over suggesting living in converted 폐기 buses, along with 'nae-ro-nam-bul' (meaning 'if I do it, it's romance; if others do it, it's an affair') cases such as high-ranking officials owning multiple homes and sending children abroad, has led young people to feel deep disappointment in the policy discrepancy and the hypocrisy of the older generation.