US Extended Deterrence: Calls for Korea's Nuclear Armament Emerge

Repeated drone attacks on Russia can be seen as security crisis management measures, and there is insufficient basis to interpret them as a sign of the regime's political legitimacy wavering, according to an analysis. Professor Jin Jae-il diagnosed that Russia's massive firepower projection appears to be an effort to maintain its will, not a sign of the regime's contraction.

Despite drone attacks, Russia continues to project immense firepower and has not lost its will to fight. This serves as evidence to refute some claims that the Putin regime is internally faltering.

Repeated drone attacks are bringing the war closer to the daily lives of Russian citizens. In particular, incidents such as drones reaching the skies above the capital and logistics warehouses burning are creating the perception that the battlefield is expanding into Russia. Professor Jin Jae-il analyzed that this situation could long-term put pressure on Russian public opinion.

Drone attacks remind Russian citizens of the reality of war, leading to accumulated fatigue and dissatisfaction. This is considered a potential factor that could ultimately lead to pressure on the regime.

A defense startup established in January 2023 successfully developed a ballistic missile and completed a test launch in June. According to Professor Jin Jae-il, this missile has a range of about 300km and is aimed for deployment this fall. It is evaluated to be similar in class to South Korea's Hyunmoo missile.

In addition to the 300km range missile, Ukraine also plans to deploy 850km range missiles in the future. This would give Ukraine triple strike capabilities including long-range drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. This is interpreted as a significant strengthening of its ability to strike Russian territory.

An analysis suggests that Ukraine's limited precision strike capability has limitations in causing large-scale impact and has clear limitations in being considered a strategic game changer. Professor Jin Jae-il mentioned the cases of Iran and North Korea, explaining that it is common to develop various types of missiles to penetrate enemy air defenses.

Nevertheless, strengthening Ukraine's strike capability is meaningful in terms of overcoming the limits of Western support and securing new attack routes. While it may not change the tide of the war, it is evaluated that it can contribute to maintaining pressure on Russia and increasing negotiation leverage.

An analysis suggests that Turkey's push to transfer US-made M270 launchers and ATACMS missiles to Ukraine is less a decision to risk worsening relations with Russia and more aimed at securing funds for its own new weapons. Professor Jin Jae-il explained that Turkey has a calculation to use the profits from selling these weapons for its own new weapon development and purchase.

Turkey is pursuing a multilateral diplomacy and hedging strategy to maintain its role as a mediator in the Russia-Ukraine war. This is interpreted as part of a complex strategy to support Ukraine on one hand while not completely severing ties with Russia on the other. Therefore, weapon support is interpreted as an act of pursuing Turkey's national interest beyond mere humanitarian concerns.

There were reports that at least two Russian tankers called at Ulsan Port to load transit and jet fuel, but this has not been officially confirmed. Professor Jin Jae-il stated that while it hasn't been officially confirmed, the situation appears to be factual. This is the first time such a phenomenon has been observed since the war in Ukraine.

Although there is no official confirmation, such movements suggest that Russia is attempting to transport energy by circumventing international sanctions. If proven true, this could pose a significant challenge to the international community's efforts to sanction Russia.

Criticism has been raised that the current government has not been able to escape for over a year from the decision to support Ukraine and sanction Russia, which was made under the Moon Jae-in administration and extended by the Yoon Suk-yeol government. Professor Jin Jae-il pointed out that South Korea is suffering losses by intervening in a war that does not serve its national interests.

This policy has provided the reason for Russia to establish relations with North Korea, raising concerns that it could negatively impact security on the Korean Peninsula. Professor Jin emphasized that South Korea should shift to a foreign policy that prioritizes its national interests.

A PanStar vessel departed Busan Port on August 22 for a trial voyage along the Arctic sea route to Florinsk, Netherlands. This route shortens the shipping distance by 33-35% compared to using the Suez Canal, with a total voyage time of 40-45 days, making it highly advantageous in terms of logistics efficiency.

The Arctic sea route has high strategic value as an alternative route that can avoid political conflict factors. However, utilizing the infrastructure of this route requires cooperation with Russia, which also carries the potential problem of expanding Russia's influence.

Therefore, the activation of the Arctic sea route is expected to be an important variable that can bring about both logistics innovation and geopolitical change.

Professor Jin Jae-il characterized Ukraine's critical remarks about South Korea as a diplomatic discourtesy, emphasizing South Korea's adherence to its defense export control laws. He expressed concern that the moment South Korea provides the Cheongung air defense system to Ukraine, Russia would provide advanced technology to North Korea.

The provision of such core strategic assets could lead to Russia's transfer of weapon technology to North Korea, posing a serious threat to security on the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, South Korea must make cautious policy decisions that prioritize national interests, not swayed by short-term international public opinion.

Professor Jin warned that Ukraine's demand for weapon support from South Korea could excessively increase the security costs South Korea would have to bear, which could destabilize the security landscape in Northeast Asia. In particular, strengthening military technical cooperation between Russia and North Korea could directly threaten South Korea's security.

Therefore, Professor Jin argues that South Korea must maintain a balanced approach between the demands of the international community and its own security realities regarding the issue of support for Ukraine, and thoroughly examine all ripple effects that may arise from decisions on weapon support.

Although the US Department of Defense is reviewing a policy to expand the role of tactical nuclear weapons, Professor Jin Jae-il stated that there is no official information on this matter yet. There have also been no official announcements regarding what changes these discussions might bring to the Korean Peninsula's defense posture.

The new US nuclear strategy appears to be a response to changes in the international security environment, but its specific impact on the Korean Peninsula remains uncertain. This raises various interpretations and concerns regarding regional security.

As North Korea already possesses intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of striking the US mainland, fundamental doubts about the reliability of US extended deterrence are widespread. Professor Jin Jae-il pointed out that the dilemma of whether to sacrifice Los Angeles, New York, and Washington to save Seoul has become a reality.

This situation increases skepticism about the US nuclear umbrella and is the background for the spread of calls for independent nuclear armament within South Korea. The perception that decoupling, the separation of security and homeland defense, is becoming a reality is growing.

Consequently, as the limitations of US extended deterrence become apparent, there is a growing call for a fundamental re-evaluation of South Korea's security strategy.

Despite discussions on a new US nuclear strategy, an analysis suggests that the short-term possibility of deploying tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula is low. Professor Jin Jae-il observed a conciliatory atmosphere between Washington and Kim Jong-un, and he viewed tactical nuclear deployment on the Korean Peninsula as merely a strategic signal, with little real chance of actual deployment.

This is interpreted as a judgment that, at this point, tactical nuclear deployment could unnecessarily create tension and hinder the dialogue phase.

Regarding the CSIS, a US private research institute, identifying South Korea's Dosan Ahn Chang-ho-class submarines as assets to counter Chinese aircraft carriers, Professor Jin Jae-il pointed out that it is more about the US wanting to utilize valuable assets held by South Korea, rather than an overall elevation of the ROK-US alliance's status. Professor Jin emphasized that while such an evaluation might be correct if our highest value is to put everything into the ROK-US alliance and side with the US, in reality, alliances are formed for our own interests.

This is a warning about the danger of South Korean assets being incorporated into US strategy, potentially involving South Korea in specific strategies regardless of its will. Professor Jin argued that South Korea's security interests and sovereign judgment should be prioritized, not an expansion of the alliance.

Therefore, Professor Jin's core argument is that South Korea needs to closely examine the essence of its alliances and its national interests, and adopt a cautious approach to US strategic demands.

Professor Jin Jae-il warned against South Korea's automatic incorporation into the strategies of US private research institutes and emphasized the need for a diplomatic declaration to prevent this. He argued that the government and media should protest and clearly declare that South Korea will not participate in specific military actions.

Professor Jin pointed out that if lines are not drawn beforehand, it could become very difficult diplomatically if South Korea gets entangled at some point. Therefore, he stressed that South Korea must protect its sovereignty and interests through clear statements of its position.