Seeing China as One-Man Rule Reveals Xi Jinping

On this global preference index, the result clearly shows how the international position of US-China relations is changing.

It is a representative example of the gap between propaganda and actual policy.

China has about 3,300 universities, while South Korea has roughly 200.

Cho Young-nam's analysis is that when Seoul National University's budget is converted to the Chinese university standard, it ranks only about 25th.

According to a report by Peking University experts, China regards South Korea as an important country.

Chinese authorities concluded that rather than continuing to press Korea, they should give Koreans easier opportunities to understand China, and this became the background for pushing visa-free entry.

Peking University scholars are studying anti-Korean sentiment in China, while Seoul National University scholars are studying anti-Chinese sentiment in Korea.

The research was agreed upon at the summit between President Lee Jae-myung and Xi Jinping during his January visit to China, and is scheduled to be presented at a conference on modern China in November.

After this episode, around 2004 to 2005, Koreans' favorability toward the United States first surpassed their favorability toward China.

China, however, consistently defended North Korea, which significantly worsened Korea-China relations.

From diplomatic normalization in 1992 until 2002, there were no major problems in bilateral relations.

The relationship developed so quickly and closely that it was hard to find a comparable case in modern diplomatic history, but after 2002, conflicts accumulated across economic, social, cultural, and military areas.

Cho Young-nam points out that China also holds the same feelings toward Korea.

However, this is not a law; it is a consensus norm among the ruling elite set in 1978 by reformists led by Deng Xiaoping during reform and opening, intended to prevent the political chaos and long-term dictatorship of the Mao Zedong era.

This is completely different from North Korea's leader-centered system, and even when top leaders are replaced, the basic mode of the system continues.

Cho Young-nam stressed that he values the Party's system more than 100 times over any particular leader.

China's reform and opening in 1978 and Vietnam's Doi Moi beginning in 1986 are examples, and the expansion of intra-Party democracy under Hu Jintao's era also followed measures Vietnam had already taken.

This confusion between North Korea and China means that once the party-state system is understood, it becomes clear why such rumors lack a basis.

Since the Soviet collapse in 1991 and through 2010, the international structure has been substantially reorganized, and it has now entered a stage beyond that.

Russia's attack on Ukraine, which began in February 2022, has continued for more than four years and six days.

America's failure to bring this war to an end shows the limits of its mediating capacity amid the changing international order.

Ukraine's being attacked by Russia is also part of this process of reorganizing spheres of influence.

Europe still maintains its EU-centered system, but in Asia China, India, Japan, and South Korea are emerging as major powers.

As power vacuums emerge, the likelihood of conflict rises, and tensions in East Asia are increasing.

The CIA director and the head of Britain's MI6 publicly raised the possibility of a Chinese attack on Taiwan in 2027 during congressional hearings.

Cho Young-nam assesses this as another variant of exaggerating the China threat, noting that China has never officially cited 2027 as an invasion timetable.

Taiwan's political circles are divided: the DPP, the ruling party, represents maintaining the status quo (not independence), while the KMT, the opposition, advocates unification.

The majority of Taiwan's people want to maintain the status quo, and their real intention is not to unify.