General Jeon In-beom: "Ranking 5th in the World in Military Power Is Meaningless"

But when you go down to squad-level firepower, the situation changes. According to him, our squads have no rockets, while North Korea has 30 each. He said we are at a level where we might have one or two at most.

He described this state of affairs as "a shortcut to ruin, historically." He also pointed out that even inside the military, people themselves say, "without the U.S. military, we'd be in big trouble."

He recalled that he entered the Korea Military Academy because he wanted to become a soldier since middle school, and that first day was the starting point where he felt the gap between ideals and reality. He wore the uniform for 38 years. When he entered in February, Taeneung was very cold and felt like a remote island. The ramen served on the first day had soaked for a couple of hours, was completely blue, and had no broth.

He viewed that units with solid camaraderie would hold their positions, while weak units, units without unity, would easily collapse.

He said that in an actual war, it may seem you will survive if you run away, but in fact more people die when they run. Therefore, he said, one must think about how holding one's current position gives a higher survival rate.

He said that when war breaks out, the first thing that happens is that things "go dark." Electricity goes out and communication is highly likely to be cut. When communication is cut, units with good unity carry out their assigned missions, but units without unity or without training become anxious and end up withdrawing arbitrarily, he said.

If that happens, the entire front line could collapse, so this is an issue that commanders must pay great attention to in peacetime, he said.

More important than that, he viewed, is the social perception that truly appreciates, respects, and recognizes those serving on active duty. He warned that otherwise, it becomes an environment where people do not feel great reward from going to the military, which is extremely dangerous.

He said that while Global Firepower claims to have analyzed 60 elements, he does not know what those 60 are. His core point was that no matter how large the pile, you have to train.

He recalled that while on active duty he said, "without sniper rifles, we'll all die," and they made him a sniper rifle costing 25 million won. Since the rifle costs 25 million won, it is too expensive, so while North Korea has 30 per company, we ended up at a level where we might have one or two.

He argued that "others have 30 and we have three, so the numbers are a bit off," and that we must build a military faithful to its essence. He warned that underestimating the enemy and over-inflating ourselves regarding force assessments like 5th in the world is historically a shortcut to ruin. Opposing conventional wisdom that says overwhelming force or North Korean nuclear weapons make this necessary, he believed training, morale, leadership, and physical conditioning should come first.

He emphasized that both the Air Force and Navy need air and naval bases, and that it is the Army that protects those bases. Citing that Ukraine has been at war for five years and cannot end it, he argued that without ground warfare holding up, it cannot be sustained. He stressed that the Air Force needs air bases and the Navy needs naval bases, and that it is the Army that protects those bases.

Citing that Ukraine has been at war for five years and cannot finish it, he argued—especially from the Army's standpoint—that without ground warfare holding up, it cannot continue.

The first priority for a solution is creating conditions for food, clothing, and sleep. So he tried to first prepare good conditions for the troops he commanded. He took care of food, clothing, and sleep, and allowed them to go out even after weekday duty hours.

This came from the awareness that KATUSA soldiers go out on weekdays, so why can't regular soldiers. He recalled that as a battalion commander he sent many out on weekend leave and overnight passes, so one battalion had more people out than the other three battalions combined. He mentioned that duty officers would erase the leading digit and report only the remaining number to higher headquarters.

He stated that after conditions were set up, he drove training hard. He emphasized that "the military must not put the cart before the horse," and that the best welfare is training soldiers well. Not creating conditions and just working people hard is rather counterproductive; he explained that after you give them benefits and then work them, there is less complaint and they are more energized.

The host added the observation that while deprivation of freedom is the same as in the past, the intensity of military life itself feels less tough than before.

He recounted that soldiers began pressing, asking why they had to wipe something again when they had wiped it yesterday, asking where it says so in the manual, and then asking who wrote that manual.

As a result, NCOs could not endure it and NCO applications have now been cut to a tenth, he said. It is a serious problem, he said.

He said that living conditions have improved compared to the father and uncle generation, but the difficulties are the same. Today's soldiers do not say after discharge that they are not afraid of North Korea and have no worries about neighboring countries.

Rather, they themselves say, "the military is in big trouble, without the U.S. military we'd be doomed," he said. They should be discharged with the confidence that we can defend ourselves, and he viewed it as a big problem that they cannot say such things.

He said that as for the recent raise in enlisted soldiers' pay itself, he would not judge whether it was good or bad. However, he pointed out that because of it, the base pay NCOs receive relatively became smaller.

As a result, he said he heard that the number applying for long-term service as NCOs has decreased greatly, and the number of current NCOs or junior officers leaving the military has also increased greatly.

This must be fixed first, he said.

Therefore, he believed that soldiers should be given only the work soldiers should do, and the military must become one faithful to its essence again.

He says he is not sure whether it was effective in eliminating abuses. Because it was done too hastily, things that should not have been removed were removed, and this must be recovered quickly, he believes.

He viewed that when there is something enormous, a backlash arises and another problem is created.

The host countered that physical training at least should be pushed through within the military. The point is that demanding national consensus in order to avoid doing promotion-related physical training for fear of complaints is a waste of consensus.

His position is that this much can be pushed through within the military. He raised a counterargument to the approach of seeking national consensus over promotion-related physical training on the grounds of complaints.

Jeon In-beom was strongly opposed to the practice of becoming a company commander, battalion commander, or brigade commander just by being promoted. Battalion commander and above must be given responsibility, so many people dislike it. He viewed that such people need not be assigned. He argued that those who are willing must receive clear compensation.

Compensation means physical compensation or compensation for promotion. He pointed out that it is not common sense to evaluate commanding a battalion of 100 troops in a front-line minefield the same as other assignments.

Not everyone needs to be a combat soldier. Among special forces, Ranger units are evaluated as having exceptional physical strength and mental fortitude. Besides the Special Warfare Command, our country has Special Forces units, and the mention came up that the JSA, where the host served, is also excellent. The host replied, "We're pretty good at shooting guns. We've shot so much."