Former Vice President Chung Mong-joon's World Cup Bid: Battling FIFA's Entrenched Corruption Structure

Lennart Johansson, president of the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA), is regarded as a figure who represented the interests of European football against FIFA's power structure centered on João Havelange (South America) and Sepp Blatter (Switzerland). He focused on enhancing the status of European football and checking the influence of the existing FIFA leadership.

FIFA operates on a 'one country, one vote' system, where all 211 member countries cast a single, equal vote. This is touted as a truly democratic electoral system where all nations, including Tonga, Russia, and China, have one vote. However, looking at regional votes—55 for Europe, 54 for Asia, 46 for Africa—the combined votes of Europe and South America do not reach the majority of 106.

Consequently, in FIFA presidential elections, the votes of third-world countries become the key variable determining victory or defeat. This structure has been criticized for serving as a channel through which past FIFA leaders politically utilized aid and World Cup berth allocations to these countries, thereby fostering corruption.

"Tonga has one vote, Russia has one vote, China has one vote. So, it's a true democracy in an election," pointed out Namgung Min, a book columnist.

President Blatter thwarted the Union of European Football Associations' demand for an audit committee within FIFA. He declared the dissolution of the audit committee through a meeting and fired all auditors, effectively neutralizing internal oversight functions.

In this process, Blatter leveraged the pretext that committee member Chung Mong-joon leaked internal FIFA information to consolidate his power. "Blatter, cornered by that, eventually declared its dissolution in a meeting. He also fired all the auditors," explained Namgung Min.

In the process of neutralizing internal audit bodies, President Blatter singled out former FIFA Vice President Chung Mong-joon as a scapegoat. He claimed, "Trust was broken. And why? Because Chung Mong-joon, the Korean FIFA committee member, leaked internal matters to the outside."

However, critics argue that he targeted Chung Mong-joon for political reasons without providing concrete evidence of the leak. This is interpreted as Blatter's intention to eliminate a political rival to consolidate his power.

The bid for the 2002 Korea-Japan World Cup was a major event during President Havelange's tenure. After Asia was confirmed as the host continent, Korea and Japan engaged in a fierce bidding competition. Japan relied on its strong economic network, while Korea highlighted its football prowess and experience hosting the 1988 Seoul Olympics.

In this process, former Vice President Chung Mong-joon began to change the existing landscape by uniting the votes of Asian countries. His proactive efforts garnered support from European factions opposing the Havelange-Blatter regime, increasing Korea's chances of winning the bid.

"It was during President Havelange's time that the 2002 Korea-Japan World Cup bid took place," added Namgung Min.

The Union of European Football Associations made a strategic choice to support Korea, thereby countering FIFA President Havelange and Japan. The predominant analysis is that European countries supported Korea not because they liked Korea, but because they disliked Japan and President Havelange.

At the time, Europe sought an alliance with Korea to thwart President Havelange's bid for re-election and expand Europe's influence within FIFA. Namgung Min's statement, "Initially, European votes started to lean towards Korea. Not because they liked Korea, but because they disliked Japan and Havelange," supports this.

Given the executive committee's voting structure at the time, Korea's sole bid could not guarantee victory. Japan also insisted on a sole bid, leaving both sides in a desperate situation. Amidst this crisis, Korea turned the tide by proposing a compromise: 'joint hosting'.

This was an offer that the opponent could not refuse, as it was effectively burdensome to push for a sole Korean bid. The Korean side stated, "We indicated that we were willing to accept joint hosting. Even so, there was caution about a sole Korean bid," revealing it was a strategic choice.

Ultimately, the joint hosting proposal eased the rigid stances of both sides, helped resolve internal conflicts within FIFA, and became a decisive factor in making the Korea-Japan World Cup a reality.

Although the power struggles within FIFA were fierce, an analysis suggests that a 'Mafia-style family structure' logic was at play, preventing the organization's foundations from breaking. The decision for Korea and Japan to co-host is interpreted as a product of compromise to prevent such organizational fragmentation.

As Namgung Min explained, "It's not about breaking the organization entirely, but ensuring our family isn't broken." FIFA prioritized its survival and the maintenance of its interests even amidst internal conflicts.

The Korea-Japan joint hosting provided Korea with the prestige of having 'Korea Japan World Cup' as the official logo name. This symbolized that Korea had achieved significant success in the World Cup bid.

On the other hand, a practical concession was made by giving up the right to host the final match to Japan. "While we naturally call it the Korea-Japan World Cup because we are Korea, the actual official FIFA logo is the Korea Japan World Cup. We secured that, but in return, we conceded the final," revealed Namgung Min.

Controversy arose during the 2002 World Cup when the referee for the match between Korea and Germany was suddenly replaced by a Swiss referee either the day before or three days prior to the match. As then-FIFA President Blatter was also from Switzerland, suspicions of biased officiating due to lingering resentment from the joint bidding process were raised.

According to foreign media reports, former Vice President Chung Mong-joon reportedly refused to shake hands with the Swiss referee at an event, expressing his displeasure. This suggests the possibility of influence from high-ranking FIFA officials in referee assignments.

It is argued that allegations of referee bribery in World Cup matches should be interpreted not merely as individual corruption but as a systemic practice. Past cases of referee Moreno's alleged corruption and subsequent conviction demonstrate that match-fixing can be used as a political tool beyond individual misconduct.

Even when such allegations are raised, FIFA's internal response often defends them with the logic of 'respecting areas of interest,' making investigations difficult. "This also raises the argument that a kind of referee politics, a referee political system, was at play," Namgung Min remarked.

The FIFA president arbitrarily exercised disciplinary powers, using them as a means to generate profit. A representative example is the suspension of a player's ban being lifted at the request of President Trump during the US World Cup. This is because the participation of star players directly translates to high viewership ratings.

"So the president grants this suspension grace. 'Ah, this time, don't miss out on the next one,'" Namgung Min's explanation illustrates a structure where the FIFA president ensures viewership and profits through suspension grace, which in turn reinforces the president's power.

FIFA's headquarters are located in Switzerland because Switzerland cultivates sports federations as a major business industry. Critics suggest that the close financial ties with Swiss banks, a hub for global capital flow, contribute to concealing FIFA's corrupt structure.

Even when controversies related to FIFA arise and the Swiss prosecutor's office initiates an investigation, most cases are often concluded vaguely through settlements. This is because the Swiss financial system provides an environment conducive to the creation and concealment of slush funds for international sports federations like FIFA, and acts as a deterrent to investigations.

"So, what's attached to this? Swiss finance is attached," Namgung Min emphasized.

FIFA's 'one country, one vote' system, intended for equality, paradoxically serves as a channel for corruption. This is because powerful nations like Germany, with the world's largest football federation, and small island nations like Tonga, Vanuatu, and Barbados, each cast one equal vote.

Smaller nations are easily susceptible to bribery or influence with minimal cost, making them prime targets in FIFA presidential elections. It is often pointed out that West African and Caribbean countries, where media scrutiny is weak, are frequently targeted for their votes.

"Ultimately, this means that, for example, Germany has the world's largest football federation... but they also have one vote, just like Tonga, Vanuatu, and Barbados, as I mentioned," Namgung Min criticized the contradiction of this system.

A German journalist identified France as being behind FIFA's power system. France is said to maintain economic dominance over its former West African colonies, controlling dozens of their votes and thus exerting enormous influence on FIFA elections.

The close relationship between President Blatter and France also supports this claim. Cases of French diplomats directly participating in FIFA election campaigns have been reported, raising suspicions that France acts as a powerful 'dark force' in international football politics.

The significant expansion of World Cup participating nations from 32 to 48 by FIFA is analyzed not merely as broadening the football base, but as 'vote-buying' and an important election campaign to secure votes in FIFA presidential elections.

The expansion dramatically increased the proportion of African and Asian teams qualifying for the finals, serving as a powerful incentive to capture votes from countries in these regions. "This, too, was ultimately a vote-buying activity, in other words, an important election campaign," asserted Namgung Min.

These expanded World Cup tickets have been used as a product of election support funds and political dealings by the FIFA president. Because national football associations can earn massive profits by qualifying for the World Cup finals, a structure has been created where they are compelled to vote for candidates favorable to them in FIFA presidential elections.

Consequently, critics argue that the expansion of World Cup participating nations has become an important political tool used to consolidate the FIFA president's power and distribute benefits.