Philippines Flags 27 Chinese Ships in Disputed Waters

These included ships from both the China Coast Guard and the People's Liberation Army Navy, emphasizing that Beijing's presence in the disputed waters involves both law enforcement and military assets.

The largest concentration of these vessels was once again observed around Bajo de Masinloc, internationally known as Scarborough Shoal.

Around Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal or Panatag Shoal in the Philippines, the AFP monitored 14 Chinese vessels: four People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) warships and 10 China Coast Guard (CCG) ships. At Ayungin Shoal, internationally known as Second Thomas Shoal, Philippine forces recorded five Chinese vessels, comprising one PLAN ship and four CCG vessels.

Six Chinese ships were monitored around Escoda Shoal, also internationally known as Sabina Shoal, and two additional CCG vessels were observed around the Pag-asa Islands area. This weekly tally indicates a total of eight Chinese naval vessels and 19 China Coast Guard ships, with more than half of all Chinese vessels positioned around Bajo de Masinloc alone during that period.

It is a weekly count covering September 1st to 7th and should not be directly compared as if it were equivalent to the AFP's full month statistics.

For August, the Philippine military reported monitoring 56 Chinese Coast Guard and naval vessels across the same four key areas. That August figure consisted of 41 China Coast Guard ships and 15 PLAN warships.

During August, 23 Chinese vessels were monitored around Bajo de Masinloc, including nine PLAN warships and 14 China Coast Guard vessels. Additionally, 18 vessels were detected around Ayungin Shoal, nine around Escoda Shoal, and six around Pag-asa Island.

These numbers reinforce a pattern Philippine officials have been highlighting throughout 2026: Chinese government vessels are maintaining a sustained and highly visible presence around features where Manila asserts sovereign rights or territorial interests. The AFP spokesperson for the West Philippine Sea, Navy Reserve Rear Admiral Roy Vincent Trinidad, has repeatedly described these activities as part of a wider challenge to Philippine maritime interests.

However, the concern extends beyond just the number of ships; their location matters just as much.

Bajo de Masinloc has emerged as perhaps the most closely watched flashpoint between Manila and Beijing. The shoal sits roughly 120 nautical miles west of Luzon, where China has maintained effective control through a constant Coast Guard presence since the 2012 standoff between the two countries.

The 2025 total itself had more than doubled the 516 ship days recorded in 2024. Chinese Coast Guard activity averaged about 156 ship days per month during the first half of 2026, compared with around 91 ship days per month in 2025.

Monitoring data indicated that multiple Chinese vessels frequently operated in a wider perimeter around Scarborough Shoal, while additional maritime militia vessels maintained a presence closer to the feature. This sustained pattern helps explain why a weekly count of 14 Chinese government vessels at Bajo de Masinloc remains important, even when the overall number fluctuates.

The concern became even more serious because Chinese maritime activity during the September 1st to 7th monitoring period was accompanied by an encounter in the air. The AFP confirmed that on September 2nd, a Philippine aircraft was intercepted by Chinese fighter jets.

Philippine aircraft were intercepted by fighter aircraft from the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) or the PLA Navy. Philippine reporting on the briefing stated that Rear Admiral Roy Vincent Trinidad disclosed that during one encounter, the Chinese fighters' targeting crosshairs were shown over a Philippine aircraft.

Manila viewed the interception as another attempt to demonstrate Chinese control over the disputed area and discourage Philippine patrol operations. The timing is significant: the aerial encounter occurred in the same week that the AFP recorded four PLAN warships and 10 Chinese Coast Guard vessels around Bajo de Masinloc. This demonstrates how the contest is increasingly taking a multi-domain approach, involving Coast Guard vessels at sea, naval warships nearby, and military aircraft operating overhead.

This position reflects a broader change in Philippine strategy under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., opting to increase activities in contested waters rather than reduce them when Chinese forces appear.

The Philippines has increased maritime domain awareness missions, strengthened cooperation among its military and civilian maritime agencies, and expanded security exercises with foreign partners. General Antonio Nafarrete became chief of staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on July 21st, 2026, succeeding General Romeo Brawner Jr., who retired after reaching the mandatory retirement age.

General Nafarrete is therefore the current AFP chief as the military confronts these continuing maritime challenges. Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. also remains at the center of Manila's increasingly firm approach toward the West Philippine Sea. During a defense dialogue this week, Teodoro again emphasized the importance of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to the Philippines and pushed back strongly against China's rejection of the 2016 South China Sea arbitration award.

China maintains sweeping claims across much of the South China Sea and rejects the 2016 arbitral award.

Beijing insists that its activities around disputed features are legitimate exercises of Chinese sovereignty and jurisdiction, a position the Philippines rejects. The tribunal, constituted under UNCLOS, found that there was no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources within sea areas falling inside its so-called nine-dash line, beyond the maritime entitlements permitted by UNCLOS.

However, the arbitration did not determine sovereignty over disputed land features such as Scarborough Shoal. That distinction remains important when discussing the ruling.

Beijing rejected the proceedings and has continued to reject the award, resulting in a continuing confrontation between legal positions and physical control at sea.

Manila points to clauses in the arbitral ruling as the foundation for its maritime rights. Beijing relies on its own sovereignty claims while maintaining significantly greater Coast Guard and naval capabilities. That disparity explains why vessel presence has become such an important measurement for Philippine authorities. A Coast Guard ship does not need to fire a weapon to influence conditions around a shoal.

Persistent patrols can restrict access, intercept approaching vessels, communicate with aircraft and ships by radio, escort other Chinese vessels, or establish a presence through which Chinese authorities appear to exercise day-to-day control. Philippine officials have therefore argued that routinely publishing vessel counts helps prevent that presence from becoming accepted as normal.

Rear Admiral Roy Vincent Trinidad has previously stressed that what is important is that their presence is still illegal. The September figures also show why attention is not limited to Scarborough Shoal. Ayungin Shoal remains sensitive because the Philippines maintains its military presence there aboard the BRP Sierra Madre.

Escoda Shoal has become another increasingly important area for monitoring due to its location near Philippine-held features and routes used for maritime operations. Pag-asa Island is different again, being permanently occupied and administered by the Philippines with civilian residents as well as government and military personnel. Manila has continued improving facilities on the island and other Philippine-held features.

The simultaneous presence of Chinese vessels around all four areas allows Beijing to maintain pressure across a broad stretch of the West Philippine Sea instead of concentrating on only one flashpoint.

The Philippines cannot match China ship for ship, as China possesses the world's largest navy by number of battle force ships and a massive Coast Guard fleet. The Philippine strategy therefore relies increasingly on surveillance modernization, persistent deployment, and cooperation with partners such as the United States, Japan, and Australia.

On September 8th, the AFP disclosed that it had separately monitored a Chinese surface action group, consisting of four warships and a replenishment vessel, moving off eastern Samar from mid-August into September. This broader maritime picture informs Manila's responses.

Rear Admiral Trinidad explained that these vessels were using an established international shipping route and remained well away from shore for most of their transit, thus not posing a direct threat. This distinction is important, as Philippine officials are not treating every Chinese naval movement near the country in the same way.

A warship exercising lawful navigation rights through international waters is different from sustained Chinese government activity around maritime features where the Philippines asserts its sovereign rights or territorial interests. For now, the 27-vessel figure provides another indication that the contest remains active.

However, 19 China Coast Guard ships and eight PLAN vessels operating around four sensitive West Philippine Sea areas within a single week demonstrate that Chinese government presence remains substantial.

Most importantly, Bajo de Masinloc continues to stand out, with 14 of those 27 vessels monitored there. During that same week, a Chinese fighter intercepted a Philippine aircraft conducting maritime patrols over the shoal. For Manila, the message is that pressure around Scarborough is no longer simply a Coast Guard issue.

Naval forces, Coast Guard vessels, and military aircraft are all operating within the same increasingly crowded strategic environment. The Philippines states its response will continue to center on surveillance, presence operations, and international law, rather than abandoning the contested waters.

As long as Chinese vessels continue appearing in significant numbers around Ayungin, Escoda, Pag-asa, and especially Bajo de Masinloc, the AFP's weekly monitoring reports will remain more than a simple tally. They are becoming a running measure of just how intense the contest for access, influence, and control in the West Philippine Sea has become.