Philippines Rejects China's BRP Sierra Madre Removal Demand

This grounded Philippine Navy vessel has long served as Manila's outpost on the shoal. The latest confrontation arose after the Chinese embassy in Manila repeated Beijing's assertion that the Philippines had previously promised to tow the vessel away. The embassy's statement also challenged Philippine activities in other parts of the West Philippine Sea, including Pag-asa Island, where it called for the withdrawal of Philippine personnel and facilities.

The Philippine government rejected China's central claim, stating there is no agreement requiring the removal of the BRP Sierra Madre. The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) made this position explicit in a September 15, 2026, statement, describing the ship as a commissioned Philippine naval vessel permanently stationed at Ayungin Shoal. Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr., as of September 2026, responded to Beijing a day later, directly stating, "They have no right to say that. So it is beyond their jurisdiction and beyond any form of intervention under international law."

From Manila's perspective, the issue extends beyond the aging vessel itself. It centers on whether China can impose conditions on Philippine activity in waters where the Philippines claims sovereign rights and jurisdiction under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The 2016 South China Sea arbitration played a significant role in establishing these rights.

In the 2016 South China Sea arbitration, the tribunal found that Second Thomas Shoal, the international name for Ayungin Shoal, is a low-tide elevation. It also concluded that the feature lies in an area where only the Philippines has possible maritime entitlements under UN law, meaning the surrounding waters can form part of the Philippines' exclusive economic zone. The tribunal further determined that no high-tide feature in the Spratly Islands generates an exclusive economic zone that would overlap the Philippine entitlement in that area. This ruling did not decide sovereignty over every island or territorial claim in the South China Sea, focusing instead on maritime entitlements and the legal status of specific features.

The Philippines has therefore continued to treat the presence of the BRP Sierra Madre and the rotation and resupply of Filipino personnel aboard it as activities carried out within Philippine jurisdiction. This includes the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf under UNCLOS, as recognized by the 2016 arbitral award. The award also clarified that, as a low-tide elevation, Ayungin Shoal cannot itself generate maritime entitlements or be appropriated as sovereign territory in the same way as an island above water at high tide.

Defense Secretary Teodoro also dismissed the importance of Beijing's latest statement regarding the BRP Sierra Madre. He stated, "Well, I will not regard their statement with any importance because it was made in an area where they have no rhyme, no reason to make any comment about, as the DFA has repeatedly said." This reflects a broader Philippine position that the country should continue exercising the rights recognized under UNCLOS rather than allowing repeated Chinese statements to redefine the legal situation. The dispute remains sensitive due to differing interpretations of sovereignty, maritime jurisdiction, and the 2016 ruling by both sides.

China's position fundamentally differs, as Beijing claims the Spratly Islands, which it calls Nansha Qundao, as Chinese territory. It has repeatedly rejected the 2016 arbitration, arguing that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction and that the award is illegal and null and void. China did not participate in the proceedings and maintains that disputes of this kind should be resolved through negotiation between the directly concerned states. This position was reaffirmed by China's foreign ministry in September 2026.

In July 2026, the Chinese foreign ministry again stated that Manila had made such commitments, urging the Philippines to remove the vessel and cease what Beijing describes as provocations at sea. However, the DFA's September 15 statement categorically denied this account, asserting there is no agreement between the Philippines and China obligating Manila to remove the BRP Sierra Madre. The DFA also stressed that the 2016 arbitral award is final and binding on both countries because the tribunal was constituted under Annex VII of UNCLOS, a treaty to which both nations are parties.

There is, however, a separate practical arrangement between Manila and Beijing covering rotation and resupply missions to the BRP Sierra Madre, announced in July 2024. This understanding aims to prevent misunderstandings and miscalculations during resupply operations. Philippine officials have repeatedly stated that this arrangement was concluded without prejudice to either side's national position and does not require the Philippines to abandon its sovereign rights or remove the ship. In August 2026, the DFA clarified that the arrangement covers principles and approaches for personnel rotation and the resupply of essential materials, not a commitment to remove the vessel. This distinction is crucial given ongoing clashes over permitted activities around the grounded vessel.

Manila has repeatedly conducted rotation and resupply missions to sustain this presence. The ongoing dispute over repairs, construction materials, and the vessel's condition has thus become integral to the larger contest for control and access at Ayungin Shoal. Teodoro's latest remarks underscore this broader context.

While the tribunal did not decide sovereignty over land territory, it rejected the idea that historic rights claims could override the maritime zone system established by UNCLOS. Defense Secretary Teodoro emphasized this point, stating, "as the DFA has repeatedly said, and their narrative of whatever sha sha sha and ta taata, which the world doesn't recognize, together with their nine-line, is something that we should not even give importance to, and we should continue to do whatever UN clause and international law gives us within our respective areas of sovereign rights or jurisdiction."

The Philippine side argues that repeated assertions from Beijing do not alter its legal position. UNCLOS itself grants coastal states sovereign rights in their exclusive economic zones for exploring, conserving, and managing natural resources, as well as jurisdiction over activities like marine scientific research and the establishment of artificial islands. The convention also preserves navigation and other lawful uses of the sea for other states, making the central question which sovereign rights, freedoms, and jurisdictional powers apply in a particular maritime area.

The convention also preserves navigation and other lawful uses of the sea for other states. The legal situation is therefore not accurately described as one country owning every part of an exclusive economic zone. Rather, the central question is which sovereign rights, freedoms, and jurisdictional powers apply in a particular maritime area.

For the Philippines, Ayungin Shoal falls squarely within the maritime zone where it asserts these rights apply. The DFA has stated that China's exercise of maritime law enforcement powers in the area infringes Philippine sovereign rights and jurisdiction. It also maintains that Philippine rotation and resupply operations are lawful. This latest exchange is part of a broader period of heightened friction between Manila and Beijing, intensifying just days before Teodoro's September 16th remarks, when the Philippine Defense Secretary publicly defended its approach to the South China Sea at the Seoul Defense Dialogue.

Just days before Teodoro's September 16th remarks, the Philippine Defense Secretary had publicly defended Manila's approach to the South China Sea at the Seoul Defense Dialogue. China, in turn, has continued to accuse the Philippines of provocation and of using the arbitral award and domestic maritime legislation to advance claims Beijing rejects. The basic divide remains unchanged: Manila states Ayungin Shoal is within its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf, that the BRP Sierra Madre may remain there, and that no agreement requires its removal. Beijing, however, refers to the shoal as Ren'ai Jiao, part of the Nansha Islands belonging to China, and continues to demand the vessel's removal.

The fundamental disagreement persists, with Manila asserting that Ayungin Shoal is within its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf, and that the BRP Sierra Madre may remain there without any agreement requiring its removal. Beijing refers to the shoal as Ren'ai Jiao, part of the Nansha Islands belonging to China, and continues to demand the vessel's removal. China also continues to reject the legal force of the 2016 ruling, while the Philippines firmly treats that award as final and binding. For now, the BRP Sierra Madre remains at Ayungin Shoal with Filipino personnel aboard, and the Philippine government publicly rejects demands for its withdrawal.

The Philippine position, as restated by Teodoro and the DFA, is that Manila will continue acting within what it considers its lawful maritime rights and jurisdiction. China's position is that those actions infringe Chinese sovereignty and maritime interests. Between these two positions sits the 2016 award, recognized and relied upon by the Philippines, rejected by China, and still at the center of one of the region's most persistent maritime disputes.

The confrontation over the BRP Sierra Madre continues to escalate, reflecting a broader contest of legal positions and control in the West Philippine Sea. The Philippine government, through Defense Secretary Teodoro and the DFA, maintains its resolve to act within its perceived lawful maritime rights and jurisdiction. Conversely, China views these actions as infringing upon its sovereignty and maritime interests. The 2016 arbitral award, which is recognized and relied upon by the Philippines but rejected by China, remains a pivotal and contested point at the core of this persistent regional maritime dispute.