US-Iran Conflict: Causes of Prolongation

From August 24, the passage of Iranian oil tankers through the Strait of Hormuz was blocked as part of an economic expulsion operation. The blockade strategy, adopted on July 14, replaced five months of direct bombardment and deepened Iran's isolation by completely halting banking transactions and air travel. This blockade is seen as a key driver in maximizing economic damage and giving the US the upper hand over bombardment. Analysts suggest that as the US tightens its economic grip, Iran, unlike its previous steadfast resistance, is losing power.

Subsequently, from August 24, the passage of Iranian oil tankers through the Strait of Hormuz was blocked as part of an economic expulsion operation, and Iran's isolation was deepened by a complete halt to banking transactions and air travel within Iran. This blockade maximized economic damage more than bombardment and became a key driving force in securing the US's upper hand.

Iran faces a severe economic crisis, with the rial exchange rate against the dollar skyrocketing from 810,000 a year ago to 2,350,000 rials today.

Due to soaring import prices, the annual inflation rate is estimated to reach approximately 89%.

With the blockade of oil tankers preventing oil exports, dollar inflows have been cut off, and 90% of flights have been blocked, effectively isolating Iran from the international community like a giant island.

These efforts, combined with pressure from the US leading to major countries like the UAE, Turkey, and Oman halting banking transactions with Iran, accelerated Iran's isolation, causing practical difficulties in international trade and purchasing daily necessities.

Iran's immediate surrender is unlikely due to its religious unity and strengthened cohesion after the assassination of its supreme leader, while President Trump faces a dilemma between consolidating power and securing approval ratings.

Indeed, in the negotiation proposals from September compared to June, the US showed a more hardline stance, demanding no lifting of the blockade and prior nuclear abandonment.

In the Iran-Iraq War, which began with Iraq's invasion in 1980, Iran gained the upper hand by recapturing Khorramshahr.

However, Iran demanded reparations from Iraq and the removal of Saddam Hussein, breaking off negotiations, and invading Iraqi territory in September 1982, which prolonged the war for another six years.

The US viewed Iran as a monolithic entity and characterized the attack on merchant ships by some hardliners as a challenge from Iran as a whole, officially resuming its blockade policy against Iran from July 14, 2019.

President Trump found it difficult to trust the opposing side due to disagreements between Iranian leadership and field commanders, creating a vicious cycle where hardliner actions within Iran provoked strong US responses.

This situation is making negotiations between the US and Iran more difficult.

Both sides distrust the other's intentions due to past negotiation failures, and within Iran, some voices show a more flexible attitude towards nuclear negotiations.

This case suggests that technically, negotiation order can be adjusted, and distrust can be resolved through third-party guarantees.

According to Professor Gormans, leaders under threat of punishment or execution at the time of signing cannot negotiate, and Professor Pape's research found only 5 cases of capitulation out of 115 sanction cases.

The pain of sanctions is primarily borne by the people, and regimes tend to choose resistance for survival, leading to the analysis that authoritarian regimes like Iran do not easily succumb to external sanctions.

Sun Tzu's 'Surround an army, leave an outlet' emphasizes leaving a gap in an encirclement, and 'Do not press a desperate foe too hard' advises against cornering an enemy. These are strategic recommendations to minimize unnecessary resistance by providing an escape route.

Currently, under economic isolation and pressure, hardliners' position in Iran is strengthening, increasing the possibility of armed provocations, and even Iranian moderates are mentioning a 'final war,' indicating a risk of escalating deterioration.

The US 30-year Treasury yield exceeding 5.5% is adding to the burden on the US economy.

If high interest rates persist for 6 months to a year or more, damage to the US economy is inevitable, and to gain an advantage in the hegemonic competition with China, the Iran war must be ended early to prevent unnecessary military spending.

President George H.W. Bush chose a strategy of immediately ending the war after the recapture of Kuwait instead of the unrealistic goal of removing Saddam Hussein, securing practical gains. This model, where allies bore 88% of war costs to protect against economic impact, is considered a successful case of limiting objectives to curb war costs and oil price increases.

He did not obsess over removing Saddam Hussein, effectively curbing war costs and oil price increases, and allies bore 88% of war costs, minimizing the economic impact on the US.

If the US continues to pressure Iranian moderates like Araghchi, it could instead lead to hardliners seizing power within Iran.

If hardliners come to power, the risk of Iran fully turning towards a pro-China stance increases, which could lead to outcomes contrary to US interests, similar to past nuclear deal collapses.

The hardline US policy is expected to gradually diminish the standing of Iranian moderates like Araghchi.

If the hardline Revolutionary Guards seize power, Iran is highly likely to strengthen its pro-China stance, which could lead to similar outcomes as when former President Trump rejected moderates.

The nuclear deal between the Obama administration and Iran's Rouhani government in 2015 was abandoned by the Trump administration in 2018. This decision eliminated the position of moderates in Iran and led to the rise of hardliners, becoming a political turning point that saw the hardline Raisi government followed by the re-emergence of the moderate Pezeshkian faction.

This led to the hardliners seizing power and US distrust, paving the way for the Raisi hardline government, but recently, the moderate Pezeshkian faction has re-emerged, showing signs of change.

Despite the recent proposal by the moderate Pezeshkian government to halt nuclear activities, Trump maintains a hardline stance, continuously pressuring Iran.

In a situation where Iranian oil exports to China are increasing, it is ultimately beneficial for US national interests if the winning side (the US) helps the opposing moderates win. There is anticipation for a shift in US policy direction after the election.

Attention is focused on how Trump's future policy decisions will affect this world order.

Treasury yields must stabilize for the dollar to stabilize, and ultimately, dollar hegemony must be stable for US international hegemony to be maintained. Trump's future policy decisions are expected to have a significant impact on this world order.