US Weighs Tactical Nuke Redeployment to Korea Amid Conventional Arms Shortage, Escalation Fears Grow

According to Korean correspondent Kim Min-seok, the thinking behind it is that nuclear weapons offer better "cost-effectiveness" than conventional arms. The tactical nuclear weapons the US uses are reportedly more than 20 times as powerful as the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

In particular, China possesses missile and drone forces far more powerful than Iran's, making the threat to US bases in the region serious.

The destruction of a THAAD missile by an Iranian drone attack in the recent Iran war suggests a similar threat exists for THAAD sites in Korea. Kim Min-seok stressed there is no guarantee such a situation won't be repeated in Korea. He noted that the US and Japan must actively invest in drone defense systems, but that their response has so far been slow.

The US is reportedly seriously short of interceptor missiles. Patriot missile stocks are at only 46% of target levels, and 80% of THAAD missiles are reported to have been expended. Restoring missile stocks to pre-war levels is expected to take at least three years, raising concern that a significant gap could open in US defenses.

The US, seeking to produce drones cheaply, looked for parts readily available on the market, which naturally led to Chinese components being used. Analysts say this, despite cost-cutting efforts, carries latent supply-chain vulnerabilities and security risks.

The Patriot and THAAD missiles, which performed well in recent interceptions, relied on extensive satellite support beyond missile performance alone. Satellites precisely tracked the enemy's launch sites and trajectories from the moment of launch, maximizing interception rates. Such precise satellite data serves as a key factor determining the success rate of missile defense systems.

US Forces Korea is known to have deployed a substantial number of nuclear weapons in the Peninsula before withdrawing its tactical nukes entirely in the late 1980s. According to researchers' estimates, the number of nuclear weapons deployed in Korea at the time ranged from at least 300 to as many as 500.

This is interpreted as an approach to cut defense spending by substituting one nuclear weapon for the cost of deploying several fighter jets or missile salvos.

US defense officials are stressing the need for credible nuclear deterrence. This reflects a determination to deter adversary provocations through a robust extended deterrence that keeps the possibility of actual use open, rather than merely serving as a bargaining chip. In other words, the view is that nuclear deterrence must function as a real threat, not an empty promise.

The B61 tactical nuke is reported to be several times more powerful than the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It is currently distributed among NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) countries in Europe, and discussions are under way on deploying it in Japan or Korea and integrating it with F-35 fighters of US Forces Korea or US Forces Japan. This could bring a major change to the security environment of the Peninsula and Northeast Asia.

Typhon mounts the launchers of Aegis destroyers on ground trucks and can be used as a tactical launch weapon depending on the situation. Russia has publicly warned it would retaliate if such a system were deployed to sites such as Pyeongtaek in Korea and has strongly objected.

Kim Min-seok therefore argued that nuclear deterrence should be used as a lever, while actual redeployment should be avoided. This is analyzed as a realistic dilemma, given the practical security burden and escalation potential of nuclear deployment.

Exports of Korea's defense industry are now hitting the limits of production capacity. Items such as LIG Nex1's missiles already have several years of orders locked in, making additional exports difficult. Kim Min-seok stressed that this shortage of supply capacity is the central challenge for Korea's defense exports, and that how to solve the production-expansion problem is ultimately what matters.

A report indicates it would take at least three years for US THAAD missile stocks to return to pre-war levels. Gulf countries, as well as the US military, have expended hundreds of Patriot missiles, sending replenishment demand soaring. Because US domestic stocks must be refilled first, the global interceptor missile supply shortage is expected to last at least five years.